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JUROR PRIVACY IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BALANCE
Melanie D. Wilson*
Abstract
Some eight million citizens report for jury duty every year.
Arguably, jury duty is one of the most significant opportunities to
participate in the democratic process. For the accused, the jury acts as
an indispensable safeguard against government overreaching. One might
expect, therefore, that our justice system would treat potential jurors
with care and tact. The opposite is true. During voir dire, prospective
jurors are required to share insights into their own lives, quirks,
proclivities, and beliefs. Litigants have probed jurors’ sexual orientation,
criminal histories, criminal victimization, health, family relations, and
beyond. A few scholars have chided the system for abusing jurors, but
courts and scholars alike have conceived of this invasion into juror
privacy as a necessary part of protecting the accused’s Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and impartial jury and the
media and public’s First Amendment rights to observe the criminal
process. This Article examines this overly simplistic view, which fails to
account for the probability that by infringing on juror privacy, the justice
system causes more jurors to lie and to withhold material information
revealing their true biases, thus undermining the accused’s
constitutional rights. Ultimately, this Article argues that juror privacy is
an imperative complement to the accused’s rights and urges a
procedural modification to the voir dire process—a juror voir dire strike,
protecting both jurors and the accused without undercutting the public
and media’s First Amendment rights to observe criminal trials.
INTRODUCTION
Some eight million Americans report for jury duty every year.1 Another three
million are summonsed but never show up.2 Jurors called for duty decide issues in
* © 2012 Melanie D. Wilson. Wilson is a professor and the Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs at the University of Kansas School of Law, mdwilson@ku.edu. I am
thankful for valuable feedback on this project from participants of workshops at the law
schools of the University of Iowa, Michigan State University, the University of Nebraska,
and the College of William and Mary. I also thank my colleagues Lou Mulligan and Corey
Yung for their helpful comments.
1
See David Schneider, Jury Deliberations and the Need for Jury Reform: An
Outsider’s View, 36 JUDGES J. 23, 25 (1997) (asserting that “[e]ach year, approximately 15
million Americans” are called to jury duty, but that “only about one-third report”); Jury
Management, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Services-and-Experts/
Areas-of-expertise/Jury-management.aspx/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (“Approximately 15
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about 154,000 trials.3 Of those 154,000 cases tried each year, about 102,000 are
criminal cases (about 72,000 felonies).4 The duty of a juror to decide the criminal
case of someone she does not know is said to be part of each American’s “exercise
of responsible citizenship.”5 “Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most
citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to
participate in the democratic process.”6 And jurors are an indispensable part of the
accused’s right to a fair trial. The constitutional right to a jury trial7 is among the
rights the Founders considered most important because it gives the people a voice
and provides a check on the government.8 Describing the importance of the jury,
former Chief Justice Taft wrote for the Supreme Court:
percent of the adult American population is summonsed to jury service each year in state
and federal courts. An estimated 8 to 10 million citizens report for jury service annually to
courthouses across the country . . . .”). See generally GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., THE STATEOF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT (2007)
(deriving estimates from the survey figures). As an example, in Connecticut about 550,000
potential jurors are summonsed for jury duty each year. Jury Administration, ST. CONN.
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/jury/faq.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
2
MIZE ET AL., supra note 1; see also Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury System in
Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas County, 54 SMU L. REV. 1813, 1814 (2001)
(discussing how 13,027 summonses were mailed and another 585 potential jurors who had
rescheduled jury duty to appear with those summonsed, resulted in only 2,214 people who
actually appeared); Robert G. Boatright, Why Citizens Don’t Respond to Jury Summonses
and What Courts Can Do About It, 82 JUDICATURE, 156, 156–57 (1999) (asserting that “the
number of citizens who merely ignore their summonses is increasing” and discussing juror
non-response rates of “20 percent in state courts and 11 percent in federal courts”).
3
MIZE ET AL., supra note 1, at 6. About 149,000 trials are held in state court; another
5,000 or so happen in federal court. Id.
4
Id. Jurors in civil cases also face probing questions during voir dire, but this Article
is limited to the issue of juror privacy in criminal cases, where the accused’s rights to a fair
and impartial jury are constitutionally guaranteed.
5
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991). The use of juries to sit in judgment of
another citizen’s guilt gives society confidence that the criminal justice system is working
fairly and effectively. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, JURY SERVICE: IS FULFILLING YOUR CIVIC
DUTY A TRIAL? 5 (2004), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/
files_flutter/1272052715_20_1_1_7_Upload_File.pdf (reporting that 75% of 1,029 adults
polled said they would want their criminal case heard by a jury, and 84% agreed that
serving on a jury is an important civic duty, which is not to be avoided).
6
Powers, 499 U.S. at 407; see also id. at 402 (“Jury service is an exercise of
responsible citizenship by all members of the community, including those who otherwise
might not have the opportunity to contribute to our civic life.”).
7
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
8
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 156 (1968) (explaining how a jury provides the accused with a buffer from “the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”).
Before the government may infringe the accused’s liberty, twelve unbiased people consider
the demeanor of the witnesses, review the tangible and other evidence, and deliberate about
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The jury system postulates a conscious duty of participation in the
machinery of justice . . . . One of its greatest benefits is in the security it
gives the people that they, as jurors actual or possible, being part of the
judicial system of the country can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse.9
Because jurors play this critical role of deciding guilt and protecting the
accused from government overreaching, during the voir dire stage of the case,
potential jurors are asked to share information about their lives, quirks, proclivities
and beliefs, and sometimes insights into the lives of their friends, relatives, and
loved ones who influence them. Judges permit litigants to probe the influence of
jurors’ experiences and relationships to expose jurors’ predispositions. In fact, the
Sixth Amendment, which mandates a trial by an “impartial” jury,10 implies the
need for some voir dire inquiry to determine that seated jurors are minimally
qualified. A future juror is not minimally qualified if she holds a bias that prevents
her from abiding by her oath and following the judge’s instructions in reaching a
verdict.11
In addition to its guarantee of an impartial jury to decide guilt, the Sixth
Amendment assures the accused that she will be tried publicly,12 and the media and
public enjoy separate First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to observe the trial of
the accused.13 Thus, when lawyers and judges evaluate jurors for partiality, the
questioning usually takes place in public.14 This intense public questioning of
potential jurors into their personal thoughts and experiences sometimes
has perverse consequences, leading litigants to seat biased and legally
unqualified jurors.15

whether the prosecutor has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See HARRIS
INTERACTIVE, supra note 5, at 5–6.
9
Balzac, 258 U.S. at 310.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . an impartial jury . . . .”).
11
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (clarifying that a juror is not
minimally qualified if bias “substantially impair[s] the performance of his duties . . . in
accordance with his instructions and his oath” (internal quotations omitted)).
12
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13
U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”); Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 723 (2010) (per curiam)
(holding that the public trial protections of both the Sixth and First Amendments extend to
the voir dire stage of a case); Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580
(1980) (holding that that right to attend criminal trials is “implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment”).
14
Presley, 130 S. Ct. at 723–24. Jurors are sometimes permitted to answer questions
in limited privacy, but even then, the trial judge, the lawyers, the accused, and the court
reporter are present. Those conversations are also documented in the record and accessible,
later, to the media and public.
15
See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
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Outside the courthouse, jurors enjoy a right to be left alone and to keep their
thoughts to themselves.16 “The common law secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall
be communicated to others.”17 So, for example, a citizen is under no obligation to
answer questions posed by a demanding police officer on a public street.18 But
inside the courthouse, during voir dire, jurors’ rights to control access to their
thoughts and, correspondingly, to refuse to answer lawyers’ questions, are less
clear.19 Because litigants seek to uncover juror bias and because jurors’ privacy
rights are imprecise, trial lawyers have become increasingly aggressive in their
questioning of prospective jurors, covering topics from bumper stickers and movie
preferences to sexual orientation, incest, and accusations of child molestation.20
Ironically, this probing for more information sometimes produces less, if not
16

See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 205 (1890) (“[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions . . . is
merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let
alone.”); see also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 775 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[O]ne aspect of the privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is the right to
keep certain information beyond official scrutiny.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
589 (1980) (“The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of
settings.”); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305 (1967) (“[T]he principal object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property . . . .”); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”);
Wolfe v. Schaefer, 619 F.3d 782, 784 (7th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that the
Fourth Amendment is relevant in cases involving “the right to conceal information
about oneself”).
17
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 198.
18
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (explaining that
although nothing in the Constitution prevents the police from addressing questions to
anyone on the streets, “[a]bsent special circumstances, the person approached . . . may
refuse to cooperate and go on his way”); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
210 n.12 (1979) (acknowledging that a person detained by police against her will “is not
obligated to answer” questions directed at her).
19
Although at one time the Supreme Court appeared to expressly recognize a
potential juror’s interest in privacy, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501, 510–11 (1984) and discussion infra Part II, modern courts routinely view jurors’
rights as subordinate to the accused’s right to a fair trial and impartial jury and the media’s
right of access to criminal trials. The legal bases for juror privacy rights may be vigorously
debated. Compare United States v. McDade, 929 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(explaining that the general condition of one’s health is an invasive topic and that jurors
have “privacy rights . . . to be let alone”), with Ackley v. Goodman, 516 N.Y.S.2d 667, 670
(App. Div. 1987) (holding that juror had no constitutionally protected right to
nondisclosure of information requested in juror questionnaire because government’s
interests outweighed any juror interests). This Article does not seek to resolve that debate.
Instead, it outlines the legal ambiguity of juror privacy rights to frame the issue of how
infringements on juror privacy undermine the accused’s constitutional rights.
20
See infra notes 48–50, 52–53, and accompanying text.
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inaccurate, information about relevant juror biases.21 Forcing jurors to respond to
personal questions intensifies the pressure on jurors to lie and to withhold material
facts, making it more likely that biased jurors will survive voir dire.22 Although it
is impossible to know how widespread jury deception reaches, stories are
proliferating of jurors who have lied.23
21

The empirical evidence is sparse on how jurors perceive the way their privacy and
that of other jurors is treated during voir dire. One study (“Rose Study”), targeting the
privacy concerns of jurors, revealed that jurors feel uncomfortable about privacy invasions,
including discomfort when other jurors are asked sensitive questions. See Mary R. Rose,
Expectations of Privacy?, 85 JUDICATURE 10, 13 (2001); see also Lauren A. Rousseau,
Privacy and Jury Selection: Does the Constitution Protect Prospective Jurors from
Personally Intrusive Voir Dire Questions?, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 287, 299–300
(2006) (asserting that “[a] number of empirical studies have established that insensitivity to
juror privacy is the primary cause of dissatisfaction with jury service. This dissatisfaction
results in a number of consequences. First, jurors try to avoid the disclosure of personal
information by evading service—many people are simply unwilling to serve on juries when
disclosure of personal matters is required. Concerns about privacy also lead jurors to fail to
disclose personal information even when directly questioned on voir dire.”). But see
Richard Seltzer et al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 451, 455
(1991) (finding that only 8% of 190 jurors, who were selected for jury service and later
interviewed, believed that questions asked of them about their crime victimization during
voir dire in the mid-1980s were “too personal”; however, 24.7% failed to reveal that they
or someone close to them had been such a victim).
22
See Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 273 (1977) (“Cases have
been reversed . . . because of answers given by prospective jurors on voir dire which
subsequent investigation established were false, or at least incorrect, and which might have
well disqualified the prospective juror.”); see also Rousseau, supra note 21, at 316–20
(discussing critiques of intrusive voir dire questioning aimed at information irrelevant to
juror bias); Seltzer et al., supra note 21, at 455–56 (discussing possible explanations for
empirical data demonstrating dishonest responses from prospective jurors during voir dire).
23
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440–42 (2000) (describing a juror who
became foreperson but did not respond when asked about relationships with potential trial
witnesses, even though she had been married to and divorced from one of the witnesses and
failed to reveal that during her divorce she was represented by the prosecuting attorney);
Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 233 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing a juror who allegedly lied
during voir dire when he denied racial prejudice and later used racial slurs and
demonstrated strong racial animus); Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1101–02 (9th Cir.
2002) (discussing juror who, during voir dire, admitted that his wife had been the victim of
a beating and robbery, but failed to disclose that his wife was also raped); United States v.
Sandalis, 14 F. App’x 287, 288 (4th Cir. 2001) (remanding for a hearing on juror bias
because juror did not disclose recent and adversarial contact with criminal defendants’
company); Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 672–74, 678 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing juror
who lied about his criminal history and other misconduct during voir dire); United States v.
Colombo, 869 F.2d 149, 150 (2d Cir. 1989) (describing juror who failed to disclose that
brother-in-law was an attorney for the government); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697,
698 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing juror who failed to disclose during voir dire that his brother
was a deputy sheriff in the office that conducted the investigation of the accused); United
States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1529–32 (11th Cir. 1984) (discussing juror who failed to
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Until now, courts and scholars have regarded jurors’ interests in privacy as
conflicting with the accused’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and an impartial
jury and the public’s First Amendment right to observe criminal proceedings.24
This Article argues that this conception is overly simplistic and, therefore,
misguided. It fails to recognize that significant infringement of juror privacy
increases the probability that partial jurors will decide guilt—thereby jeopardizing,
not supporting, the accused’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. While
juror privacy sometimes conflicts with First Amendment rights of the press
and the public to watch a trial, such privacy is an imperative complement to the
accused’s rights.
To safeguard both juror privacy and the accused’s Sixth Amendment interests,
this Article proposes a procedural modification to the voir dire process, a
modification that also avoids violating the First Amendment rights of the media
and public. It advocates a strike for jurors to exercise during voir dire. Trial judges
may implement this change in individual cases, or local rules, and legislation may
effect this change to voir dire more broadly. When employed reasonably, this new
juror strike will permit each juror to avoid overly intrusive and counterproductive
questioning. Jurors who rely on their personal strike will invoke it on the public
record but will then be permitted to protect themselves from embarrassment or
discomfort by withdrawing from a particular case and returning to the jury pool for
service in another matter. It will also motivate lawyers to critically cull their
questions for relevance and necessity and will encourage trial judges to maintain
careful control of voir dire, control that has grown scarce in recent years. At the
same time, it will give lawyers more comfort to probe deeply when a particular
issue in a given case warrants inquiry into a sensitive matter.
This Article develops in four parts. Part I discusses the public and
increasingly intrusive nature of voir dire and its consequences for the integrity of
the jury process and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the accused.
Part II demonstrates that while potential jurors retain some legal protections

disclose during voir dire that he had been a participant in prior civil and criminal litigation
and that he knew the accused); Banther v. State, 783 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Del. 2001)
(discussing jury foreperson who failed to disclose during voir dire that she had been the
victim of a serious, violent crime); Young v. State, 720 So.2d 1101, 1102–03 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (describing juror who failed to disclose that he had been molested); State v.
Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 471 (Ind. 2003) (discussing juror who, during voir dire, failed to
reveal her family’s criminal history and her own history as a rape victim); State v. Jenkins,
2 P.3d 769, 771 (Kan. 2000) (describing juror who failed to disclose that her son had been
murdered); State v. Harris, 652 N.W.2d 585, 587–88 (Neb. 2002) (describing juror who
failed to disclose that she previously had been convicted of a felony); Canada v. State, 944
P.2d 781, 782–83 (Nev. 1997) (describing juror who repeatedly lied during voir dire by
saying that no one in his family had been victimized by violent crime when, in truth, his
father had been murdered); State v. Hatcher, 568 S.E.2d 45, 47 (W. Va. 2002) (discussing
juror who lied in voir dire about whether a family member had ever been the victim of a
violent crime).
24
See infra Part III.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2033885

2012]

JUROR PRIVACY IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BALANCE

2029

throughout voir dire, the Supreme Court’s murky privacy jurisprudence, as well as
the Court’s lack of clarity surrounding juror privacy, in particular, have left lower
courts doubtful that juror privacy deserves more than a minor consideration in the
balance of trial interests. Part III explains that lower courts and scholars have
undervalued the importance of juror privacy when assessing the accused’s
constitutional rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury. In weighing the accused’s
rights, scholars and lower courts have considered the rights of the accused as
competing against jurors’ privacy rights, instead of recognizing that juror privacy
is a necessary complement to the rights of the accused. Part IV then offers a
practical solution, a voir dire strike for jurors, to protect both juror privacy and the
accused’s rights without jeopardizing the media and public’s First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to access. This juror voir dire strike will alleviate the pressure
on jurors to conceal information or to lie in response to voir dire questions that
would prove embarrassing. Empowering jurors during voir dire will tend to give
the litigants more reliable information on which to base their peremptory strikes
and will promote integrity of the jury-trial system.
I. PUBLIC VOIR DIRE—ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
Part I.A. outlines the legal and historical grounds for public voir dire, explains
how modern voir dire creates more risk of juror dishonesty, and highlights the
risks to the accused of the modern trend of probing jurors’ backgrounds and
beliefs. Part I.B. demonstrates that intrusive voir dire encourages more jurors to lie
and to withhold information relevant to juror partiality.
A. The Public Nature of Voir Dire and Its Historical Roots
In addition to providing the accused with a jury trial right, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees that the accused in a criminal case will be tried publicly.25
The First Amendment grants the press and the public a similar right to observe
criminal trials.26
[T]he public trial provision . . . is a “guarantee to an accused” designed
to “safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of
25

The Sixth Amendment provides “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538
(1965) (“We start with the proposition that it is a ‘public trial’ that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees to the ‘accused.’”).
26
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (interpreting the First Amendment as guaranteeing the press access to
criminal trials even when young witnesses are testifying on a sensitive subject, such as
rape); Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (“[T]he right to
attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment.”).
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persecution.” Clearly the openness of the proceedings provides other
benefits as well: it arguably improves the quality of testimony, it may
induce unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony, it
may move all trial participants to perform their duties conscientiously,
and it gives the public the opportunity to observe the courts in the
performance of their duties and to determine whether they are
performing adequately.27
Although the voir dire stage of a criminal case technically precedes the trial,
the constitutional guarantees of public access extend to voir dire also.28 According
to the Supreme Court, “[B]eginning in the 16th century, jurors were selected in
public.”29 The open jury selection process in England “carried over into
proceedings in colonial America.”30 Although the Court has said that closed
proceedings are “not absolutely precluded,” it has warned that they “must be rare
and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness.”31 Because the
voir dire of potential jurors is a part of the public trial, the court reporter
documents jurors’ responses to questions, and those responses are typically
available in the form of a transcript long after the trial ends.32
Although voir dire in this country has always been open to the public, the
evidence is sparse on whether it has also traditionally required potential jurors to
reveal private information as part of that public process. In 1976, Jon Van Dyke,33
noting the history of voir dire in America, explained:
During the early days of the Anglo-Saxon jury, litigants had no right to
question prospective jurors about their prejudices. . . . Jurors could be
challenged for specific bias, such as blood, marriage or economic
27

Estes, 381 U.S. at 583 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
266, 270 (1948)).
28
Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 723 (2010).
29
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 507 (1984).
30
Id. at 508 (“Public jury selection . . . was the common practice in America when the
Constitution was adopted.”).
31
Id. at 509; see also Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984) (acknowledging that
the right to an open trial “may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as
. . . the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information,” but such
circumstances “will be rare”).
32
A juror’s answers are documented in the record and are typically available to the
public even when the juror expects (or is told by the judge) that her answers will be kept
private. See Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 512–13 (rejecting the prosecutor’s argument that
jurors who were questioned out of the presence of the public on sensitive issues expected
that their answers would be afforded confidentiality); Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding
Juror Privacy, 85 JUDICATURE 18, 23 (2001) (stating that because jury disclosures
are often “highly sensitive or embarrassing to jurors, case law is replete with examples
of judges who have tried, usually unsuccessfully, to keep this information from
public disclosure”).
33
At the time, Van Dyke was a professor of law at Hastings College of Law.
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relationship to a litigant; but a nonspecific bias, such as ill-feeling toward
a litigant’s class, race or religion, could not be the basis for a challenge
for cause, and no questioning on such matters was allowed.34
By 1807, Chief Justice John Marshall, while presiding over the criminal case
of Aaron Burr, declared that juror prejudice was a proper basis to challenge a juror
for cause.35 But even after Marshall’s influential ruling, courts continued to
constrain voir dire questioning. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of
California, the Court noted that historically the accused was permitted to voir dire
potential jurors about their “Interest in the Cause” and to ask “whether [they] be
fitly qualified, according to Law by having a Freehold of sufficient Value.”36 In a
decision dating back to 1813, appellate judges in South Carolina explained the
narrow reach of such voir dire. Judge Colcock wrote:
[H]ence originated the practice of examining jurors on their voire dire,
merely to ascertain whether they were, in this respect qualified to sit. . . .
“[T]he juror challenged, may, on his voire dire be asked such questions,
as do not tend to disgrace; as, whether he has a freehold . . . ? Whether he
has an interest in the case? Whether he has given an opinion before hand
upon the right? [W]hich he might have done, as an arbitrator between
the parties.” . . . Even there, it will be observed, there is a limit beyond
which the triors could not go. They were not permitted to ask questions
tending to the disgrace or the dishonor of the juror on his voire dire.
....
. . . That a man should be made to disclose his secret thoughts
savours strongly of inquisitorial power, and is as much at war with my
feelings as my judgment.37
Judge Nott, in the same case, added:
The rule of law with regard to the examining of a juror on his voir
dire is precisely the same as that relative to a wtiness [sic]. You may not
ask a witness any question which goes to his disgrace . . . .
34

Jon Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should It Be Conducted to Ensure that Our Juries
Are Representative and Impartial?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 65, 67 (1976).
35
Id. at 68–69 (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692g)).
36
Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 506 n.4 (quoting Peter Cook’s Trial, 4 Har. St. Tr.
737, 738–40 (O.B. 1696)).
37
State v. Baldwin, 6 S.C.L. (1 Tread.) 289, 291–93 (1813) (opinion of Colcock, J.)
(quoting 3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 267 (6th ed. 1793)).
“Triors” were persons appointed by the court “whose duty it was to ascertain, whether the
jury were all impartial and qualified to sit.” Id. at 291–92; see also id. at 304 (opinion of
Smith, J.) (explaining that jurors may be asked “such questions as do not tend to infamy
and disgrace; such as, whether he hath a freehold, whether he had an interest in the cause”).
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....
. . . [A] juror cannot be compelled to answer such questions, surely
he may be permitted to do so. If he does not make the objection, no
person can make it for him.38
Similarly, in 1823, the Virginia General Court,39 reflecting on the role of “for
cause” strikes in England, suggested that a juror may have enjoyed protection
against questions calling for an answer that would tend to cause the juror “infamy,
or disgrace.”40 The Georgia Supreme Court noted in 1897 that “neither the court
nor counsel should ask any question which would involve a breach of the juror’s
privilege to refuse to answer on the ground that so doing would tend to
incriminate, or otherwise disgrace, him . . . .”41 In 1928, the Supreme Court of
California rejected a criminal defendant’s appellate argument that he was unduly
limited in his voir dire questioning about jurors’ affiliations with secret
organizations, noting, “It is now well settled in this state that a juror may not be
examined on voir dire solely for the purpose of laying the foundation for the
exercise of a peremptory challenge.”42 In 1977, in Commercial Printing Co. v.
Lee,43 the Arkansas Supreme Court, sitting en banc, was asked to rule that the press
and the public were entitled to attend voir dire of jurors. In deciding that the public
should have access, the court explained the limited reach of voir dire at that time.
Normally, lawyers ask prospective jurors if they know anything about
the facts of the case[,] if they have talked with any person concerning the
facts who purports to be a witness[,] if they are represented by one of the
attorneys involved their feelings about the possible punishment that
might be imposed[,] or if there is any reason why they could not give
both the state and the defendant a fair and impartial trial. Facts of the
case are not generally discussed in voir dire; of course, publicity about
the circumstances of the crime itself any statements that had purportedly
been made by witnesses, defendant, etc., were published when the crime
happened or when the arrest was made.44
Thus, while voir dire enjoys a long tradition of openness, its history also
reveals a long trail of restricting the scope and reach of counsel’s questions. Voir
dire in America has always been conducted publicly, but until more recently, jurors

38

Id. at 297–98 (opinion of Nott, J.).
Sprouce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 375, 376 (1823).
40
Id. at 378.
41
Ryder v. State, 28 S.E. 246, 248 (Ga. 1897).
42
People v. Ferlin, 265 P. 230, 235 (Cal. 1928).
43
553 S.W.2d 270 (Ark. 1977).
44
Id. at 273.
39
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were not expected to endure probing questions calling for embarrassing answers as
part of a fishing expedition for ill feelings toward litigants.45
Intuition might suggest that protecting jurors from abusive questioning during
voir dire would be a top priority for trial judges, prosecutors, and defense
counsel.46 After all, alienating the very people who will decide guilt seems unwise,
both in the individual case and because jurors are a fundamental part of our
criminal justice system. But protecting jurors from too many questions poses some
risk of allowing a partial juror to survive voir dire. Because the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the accused an impartial jury,47 determining juror impartiality is a
necessary component of every jury trial. Over time, litigants and trial judges have
focused so much attention on probing jurors for bias that they have neglected juror
privacy and its importance to juror honesty about those pertinent biases. In contrast
to voir dire’s historical roots, demonstrating restraint in the questioning of jurors,
modern voir dire reaches far beyond basic questions of minimal juror qualification.
Litigants regularly ask questions to determine the influence of jurors’ relations
with friends and loved ones, as well as the jurors’ experiences and personal habits.
Prospective jurors have been asked to reveal information about their victimization,
their health and use of legal and illegal medications, their families and income
levels, whether they have filed for bankruptcy, their religious and political beliefs,
their intimate sexual relationships, their television habits, and many other
potentially sensitive topics.48

45

JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 144 (1977) (noting that by 1977,
“questioning for nonspecific bias ha[d] been expanding” and that inquiry into prejudice
against race, religion, ethnicity, or other group bias was “increasingly accepted by the
courts”). A study of twenty-three consecutively tried jury trial cases in the Midwest found
that voir dire was “devoid of the spectacular,” and lasted on average about one half hour.
Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503,
503–04 (1965). During voir dire jurors were asked about their occupations: “Could the
veniremen be fair and impartial? Did they have anything so pressing that they could not
give their full attention to the trial? Would they follow the law?” and other benign
questions. Id. at 507 (noting that “seldom did a lawyer probe . . . deeply” during voir dire).
46
See VAN DYKE, supra note 45, at 163 (“Some jurors take offense at being asked
highly personal questions aimed at discovering prejudices that attorneys believe cannot be
discovered merely by direct questioning.”).
47
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
48
See, e.g., Karen Monsen, Privacy for Prospective Jurors at What Price?, 21 REV.
LITIG. 285, 285–86 (2002) (referencing a scenario where one juror was pressed to reveal
for the first time that her stepfather had raped her, a secret she had withheld from everyone,
including her husband); Lauren A. Rousseau, Privacy and Jury Selection, supra note 21, at
288 (noting that jurors are often asked about “the books they read, the television shows
they watch” and much more); David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy:
Constitutional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1997) (noting that
jurors are subject to “intrusive questioning, disclosure of their answers to the news media,
background investigations by counsel, release of their name and address to the defendant
and the public, and repeated attempts by the press to obtain post-trial interviews”); see also
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For example, in the criminal case charging NBA basketball player Kobe
Bryant with sex crimes, potential jurors were asked eighty-two questions in a
written questionnaire before they arrived in court. The questionnaire began with
questions about where jurors grew up and with whom they shared their homes and
extended to inquiries into whether jurors had ever contacted a rape crisis center or
felt in danger of a sexual assault.49 In a separate criminal case charging child
molestation and first-degree rape of a child, jurors were recently asked whether
they had been the victim of sexual abuse or accused of committing a sexual
offense.50 The eleven jurors who initially answered “yes” to either question were
then asked follow-up questions in the judge’s chambers. The trial judge,
prosecuting attorney, defense counsel, and the accused were present for the followup.51 From the lawyers’ vantage, these and other probing questions may appear
sensible. From the jurors’ perspective, however, the inquiries often seem irrelevant
and harassing.52 Oral voir dire, either by itself or after completion of a written
questionnaire, can quickly prove uncomfortable, exposing, and embarrassing.
Because the process of voir dire is often unfamiliar to jurors, it may seem to
them as impersonal as a stranger asking questions of a passerby on a public
sidewalk. Imagine the stranger approaches the passerby and asks in a polite voice:
Have you ever been the victim of a sexual assault? Tell me the details. Have you
been accused of sexual abuse or child molestation? Have the police investigated
you for other inappropriate sexual behaviors? What do you think about abortion?
Are you gay? What television shows do you watch? Tell me about your children
and your hobbies. Are you taking any prescription medications? Why do you take
those drugs? Do you belong to, or support, any political groups? Have you been
treated for a drug addiction? Ever called a rape crisis line? Are you an only child?
United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that jurors were asked
about tax liens filed against them and audits of their taxes).
49
Bryant Jury Questionnaire Released, VAILDAILY.COM (Aug. 30, 2004),
http://www.vaildaily.com/article/20040830/NEWS/40830006/ (publishing the jury
questionnaire used in People v. Bryant, No. 03-CR-204 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2004)).
50
Washington v. Strode, 217 P.3d 310, 312 (Wash. 2009) (explaining that these initial
questions were asked in “a confidential juror questionnaire”).
51
Id. at 312–13. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that the trial
judge committed a structural error in closing the proceedings without conducting a more
intricate analysis of the need for closure. Id. at 316. The closure, the court said, denied the
defendant the right to a public trial. Id. at 314. The court reversed the defendant’s
conviction and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 316.
52
See Hannaford, supra note 32, at 18 (“Numerous studies document that perceived
insensitivity to the privacy concerns of prospective jurors is one cause of dissatisfaction
with jury service.”); see also HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 5, at 12 (finding that 17% of
1,029 adults polled revealed that they do not believe that jurors are treated well by the court
system, and 30% had no opinion on the subject); Broeder, supra note 45, at 506, 510–21
(suggesting that prospective jurors often withhold the truth when questioned in voir dire);
Rousseau, supra note 21, at 298 (“[T]rial attorneys’ demands for increasing amounts of
personal information from jurors . . . directly conflicts with the American population’s
increasing interest in keeping such information private.”).
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The youngest? How old are your children? Where do they live? Where do you
work? In what religion were you raised? These questions and many like them have
been asked of prospective jurors during voir dire.53 Because voir dire covers so
many topics, even jurors with no special sensitivity and nothing in particular to
hide sometimes worry about exposing their private information.54 Outside of the
voir dire process, jurors’ privacy is protected by various statutes55 and by the
53

See, e.g., Jury Questionnaire at 14, 17, United States v. Sypher, No. 3:09CR-85-S,
2010 WL 2108460 (W.D. Ky. May 24, 2010); Watts v. Maine, No. 08-290-B-W, 2009 WL
249236, at *4 (D. Me. 2009) (asking about juror’s sexual abuse and charges of sexual
assault or abuse); Final Juror Questionnaire, United States v. Bonds, 580 F. Supp. 2d 925
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C 07-00732), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/
filelibrary/596/304.pdf; Jury Questionnaire at 3, 7, People v. Jackson, No. 1133603 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. June 13, 2005), available at http://jurylaw.typepad.com/Michael_Jackson_
questionnaire.pdf (asking about placement among siblings and allegations of inappropriate
sexual behaviors); United States v. O’Driscoll, No. 4:CR-01-277, 2002 WL 32063813, at
*5 (M.D. Pa. May 28, 2002) (asking about television shows and religion); see also Joseph
A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires: (Ab)using Jurors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2007)
(listing famous cases in which potential jurors were asked to complete a probing jury
questionnaire, including in prosecutions of Richard Scrushy, O.J. Simpson, Martha
Stewart, Zacarias Moussaoui, Michael Jackson, Scott Peterson, Eric Rudolph, and many
others); Bryant Jury Questionnaire Released, supra note 49 (publishing voir dire questions
from Kobe Bryant’s trial).
54
One study of 348 people who participated in voir dire in one North Carolina county
revealed that about 27% of potential jurors felt “uncomfortable” during voir dire, and about
27% said that the questioning seemed “too private.” See Rose, supra note 21, at 13. The
empirical evidence on how jurors perceive the way their and other jurors’ privacy is treated
during voir dire is sparse. Some studies indicate that jurors often consider financial issues
when deciding whether to appear or to ask to be excused from jury duty. See, e.g.,
Boatright, supra note 2, at 162. The Rose Study reveals that at least some jurors
experienced discomfort when other jurors were asked sensitive questions. See Rose, supra
note 21, at 13; see also John Asbury, Attack on Jurors Prompts Review of Court Safety,
PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), May 29, 2010, at A1 (reporting that jurors who
convicted a gang member of killing a sixteen-year-old boy were confronted by the
defendant’s angry family outside the courthouse after the verdict); Broeder, supra note 45,
at 506 (noting that the results of an empirical study of Midwestern juries in the late 1950s
revealed “numerous instances of conscious concealment and lack of candor” by
prospective jurors during voir dire); Seltzer et al., supra note 21, at 456 (noting that 52% of
jurors asked whether they had personally been the victim of crime did not reveal the
information during voir dire); Adam Walser, Juror in Lloyd Hammond Murder Trial
Allegedly Threatened by Audience Member, WHAS11.COM (Jun. 25, 2010, 7:18 PM),
http://www.whas11.com/home/Juror-in-Lloyd-Hammond-murder-trial-felt-threatened-byaudience-member--97185784.html (describing a juror in the murder trial of a suspected
gang leader who reportedly felt threatened by a person in the audience of the trial).
55
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2006) (protecting patients against disclosures of
their health information); 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2011) (protecting cable customers against
collection and distribution of data without consent); FED. R. EVID. 412 (protecting from
disclosure in civil or criminal proceedings evidence of victim’s sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition).
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Constitution.56 But once part of the jury pool, citizens are treated as though their
rights evaporate. Jurors who refuse to answer questions on grounds of privacy may
be held in contempt of court and jailed.57
Trial judges are expected to protect jurors and ensure the accused’s rights of
impartiality by exercising control over voir dire questioning. As the Supreme
Court said in Press-Enterprise, “a trial judge must at all times maintain control of
the process of jury selection.”58 Because the legal standard for juror impartiality is
relatively easy to satisfy, the judge has significant latitude to protect jurors from
oppressive questioning in most cases and under most circumstances. An impartial
jury is one that “consists of nothing more than ‘jurors who will conscientiously
apply the law and find the facts.’”59 The Sixth Amendment guarantee of “an
impartial jury” is breached only if potential jurors are predisposed to guilt and
when they hold some extensive bias against the accused. Litigants may strike for
cause those jurors who cannot decide the case on the facts presented and others
who will not follow the judge’s instructions about the law. “[T]he proper standard
for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his
or her views . . . is whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and
his oath.’”60
Of course, the litigants may also exercise a limited number of peremptory
challenges to remove jurors for any reason, no matter how eccentric, so long as the
party does not strike a potential juror on the basis of her gender, ethnicity, or
race.61 But, peremptory challenges “are not of constitutional dimension.”62 They
are “part of our common-law heritage” designed to “reinforc[e] a defendant’s
[jury] right.”63 Because the peremptory strike is designed to give the parties added
assurances about the ability and willingness of a sitting jury to hear the accused’s
case with an open mind and a clear conscience, the trial judge is empowered to

56

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 353–54 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
58
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 512 (1984).
59
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 423 (1985)).
60
Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (stated in the context of a capital punishment case);
see also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (“It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside
his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.”).
61
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (“[N]o citizen is disqualified from
jury service because of his race.”); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,
143 (1994) (holding that litigants may not strike potential jurors solely on the basis of
gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (holding that peremptory
challenges must be race neutral). The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether religion
is a prohibited basis to strike.
62
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307 (2000) (citing Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)).
63
Id. at 311.
57

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2033885

2012]

JUROR PRIVACY IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BALANCE

2037

limit inquiries that probe jurors’ privacy too deeply or that are only marginally
probative of bias.64
Perhaps because bias can be difficult to identify, trial judges have increasingly
permitted litigants to ask expansive questions of jurors,65 covering issues of their
childhood, sexuality, relationships, health, and much, much more. Trial judges
allow the parties to ask questions that may reveal the jurors’ hidden leanings. As
one scholar put it, “a certain amount of information from prospective jurors is
required.”66 One cannot seat a fair and impartial jury to hear a case without having
some information to suggest that each juror qualifies, at least minimally.67
Nevertheless, when a judge permits the litigants to ask potential jurors questions
that require embarrassing answers, the voir dire process may backfire and result in
less, and inaccurate, information about juror biases.68 Because they enjoy
significant discretion during voir dire, judges across the country vary widely in
how they manage the process. A few judges ask all of the questions. Many judges
allow the lawyers to ask a majority of questions. Some judges preview the
litigants’ proposed voir dire. Many do not.69 Judges also vary significantly in how
64

The voir dire process is “to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a favorable one.” PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 n.9 (1984).
65
See, e.g., VAN DYKE, supra note 45, at 168 (noting the reluctance of jurors to
acknowledge bias, especially race bias); Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving
“Its Wonderful Power,” 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 548 (1975) (asserting that “[i]ncreasingly
judges are conducting voir dire examinations rather than allowing counsel” to do so and
arguing that attorneys probe more deeply and uncover more information pertinent to
exercise of the peremptory strikes).
66
Rousseau, supra note 21, at 294.
67
See Roseles-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(“Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors
who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence
cannot be fulfilled.”); Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413–15 (1895) (noting the
trial court’s broad discretion to conduct sufficient voir dire).
68
See discussion infra Part I.B.1; see also Broeder, supra note 45, at 506 (noting that
the results of an empirical study of Midwestern juries in the late 1950s revealed “numerous
instances of conscious concealment and lack of candor” by potential jurors during voir
dire); Hannaford, supra note 32, at 23–24 (arguing that failure to protect juror privacy can
undermine the litigants’ ability to elicit sufficient information to assess partiality).
69
See Rousseau, supra note 21, at 309–10. In Rousseau’s article, she notes:
In October 2005, eighteen federal district court judges serving in eleven
different states were surveyed regarding their voir dire practices. The survey
responses demonstrate the lack of consensus regarding the appropriate scope of
voir dire. When asked what standard they use to determine whether a voir dire
question should or should not be asked, the judges’ responses ranged from “I
generally let the lawyers ask what they want” to “[I] require that the question be
relevant to a showing of bias . . . or relevant to the issues in the case.”
Approximately one third of the federal judges surveyed indicated that they
employ virtually no limitations with regard to the types of questions permitted,
but that they limit the duration of lawyer questioning to 20 or 30 minutes.
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much latitude they give lawyers to explore bias.70 Many permit litigants to ask
almost unlimited, open-ended questions. Because courts and scholars have
undervalued the risk that pressuring jurors to reveal sensitive information publicly
will encourage jurors to lie and withhold information pertinent to jurors’ biases,
judges have perceived few incentives to restrict lawyers from asking probing
questions. The argument, repeated in different ways by courts and scholars, in
favor of delving into jurors’ privacy is captured by a quote from Barbara Babcock:
“It is simply in the very nature of the peremptory that deeper, further-ranging
questions are necessary for its meaningful exercise.”71 And because each litigant
hopes to rid the pool of all unfavorable jurors, neither the prosecutor nor the
defense may serve as “a motivated, effective advocate for the excluded
venirepersons’ rights.”72 Moreover, judges want to protect the record on appeal, so
as long as litigants and judges remain convinced that probing questions will reveal
biased and unsupportive jurors, voir dire will continue to infringe
upon juror privacy.
B. The Consequences of Public Voir Dire
This section argues that courts, scholars, and litigants have failed to appreciate
that infringing on juror privacy causes more jurors to lie and to withhold
information, thus undermining the accused’s constitutional rights to an impartial
jury and fair trial and undercutting the integrity of the jury system.
1. Intrusive Questions Burden the Accused’s Constitutional Rights
One underappreciated consequence of pressing jurors to answer personal and
marginally relevant questions publicly is that prying questions can backfire, giving
Another third was at the opposite end of the spectrum, indicating that they limit
voir dire questions to those calculated to show bias and/or those directly relevant
to the issues in the case.
The final third fell somewhere in between these two extremes. Some in this
group said that the sole substantive limitation that they employ relates to the
“argumentative” nature of the question. Others said that they permit questions
going beyond those relevant to a showing of bias, allowing attorneys to inquire
regarding the backgrounds, attitudes and cultures of the potential jurors.
Id. (citations omitted).
70
See, e.g., Vanessa H. Eisemann, Striking a Balance of Fairness: Sexual Orientation
and Voir Dire, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 14–15, 25–26 (2001). Eisemann provides
numerous examples of differences among trial judges’ treatment of the issue of
homosexuality. Id. Eisemann also notes that some jurors in California formed negative
impressions from negative experiences, including one juror who was asked if he had “more
straight friends or gay friends.” Id. at 8 n.55.
71
Babcock, supra note 65, at 558.
72
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991) (stating that the criminally accused
shares an interest with jurors to avoid race-based peremptory strikes).
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litigants less information and even incorrect information about juror biases.73 In all
cases in which jurors lie to avoid embarrassing answers, the justice system risks
that empanelled jurors are partial in ways that violate the accused’s right to an
impartial jury and fair trial.74 Because there are few studies on jury dishonesty,75
there is no way to quantify how many jurors lie during voir dire to protect
information they deem embarrassing or fail to disclose information responsive to
lawyers’ questions that they believe is too personal.
Scholars have explored in great depth the incentives for police to evade the
exclusionary rule76 and for cooperating witnesses (typically accomplices) to lie on
the witness stand and point the finger at the accused to reduce their own criminal
liability.77 Scholars have also written extensively about the harm to the criminal
justice system from prosecutors who overreach and engage in deceit and those who
fail to comply with their Brady and other obligations, to “do justice.”78 But the
literature has neglected the intensifying pressure on jurors to lie and to actively
conceal responsive and material information during voir dire.79 Consider the jury

73

Although some scholars have noted this risk in passing, none, to my mind, have
acknowledged the severity (and growing pervasiveness) of the problem. See, e.g., Broeder,
supra note 45, at 510–13 (noting several specific examples of venireperson deception
during voir dire); Stephen A. Gerst, Balancing the Rights of the Public with the Jurors’
Right to Privacy During the Jury Selection Process, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 1278, 1287 n.39
(citing studies of jurors who failed to disclose that they or family members had been
victims of crime); Hannaford, supra note 32, at 23; Rousseau, supra note 21, at 300–01.
74
“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of
course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 543 (1965) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
75
The Rose Study was not directed at juror dishonesty, but it did reveal relevant
information about juror discomfort during voir dire. See Rose, supra note 21. Juror
discomfort about disclosing information seems to explain why most jurors withhold or lie
to avoid such disclosures. See Broeder, supra note 45 (recounting specific instances of
juror dishonesty discovered during a 1950s empirical study); Seltzer et al., supra note 21
(recounting prior studies).
76
See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1315 (1994);
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 365–66.
77
Monroe H. Freedman, The Cooperating Witness Who Lies, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
739, 739 (2010).
78
See generally ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR (2007) (discussing widespread prosecutorial noncompliance with Brady
obligations); R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem
of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1431 (2011) (recounting several
cases in which prosecutors engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose Brady material).
79
In Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” Barbara Babcock touched on the
psychology of potential jurors who decide they want to be selected for a jury. “[S]uch
people will evade or misconstrue, unconsciously or deliberately, general voir dire questions
[directed to the whole venire] in order to avoid answering and possibly being struck.”
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questionnaire sent in advance of oral voir dire in the Barry Bonds criminal case
charging the professional baseball player with lying and obstruction of justice. The
questionnaire began by asking jurors for their names, community, age, gender, and
whether they rented, owned a home, or lived in someone else’s home.80 Even these
seemingly innocuous questions may be embarrassing to some prospective jurors;
for example, a juror who lost his house in a foreclosure, or the juror who is
temporarily living in a hotel or a homeless shelter, and the one who seeks to
conceal his lost employment, her domestic abuse, or victimization. The Bonds
questionnaire also inquired into jurors’ marital status, asking each juror to choose
between single and never married; divorced, not remarried; widowed, not
remarried; married; divorced and remarried; single but living with nonmarital
partner.81 Again, these questions may seem innocuous to many potential jurors, but
what about the gay juror who will lose her job if her employer finds out that she is
living with a same-sex partner? That juror may be unlikely to tell the truth and
expose herself to possible loss of employment for the sake of jury duty.
As with other forms of dishonesty, jury deceit is difficult, if not impossible, to
quantify, but the number of anecdotal accounts of jurors who distort and withhold
material information is growing.82 A practicing lawyer, Elliott Wilcox, says that he
has proof of the growing problem. In an essay on jury dishonesty, he reports that in
five cases he recently tried, he was armed with a criminal history check on every
potential juror.83 The jurors were unaware of the report. In all five cases, jurors
were asked if they had ever been arrested or charged with a crime. “[I]n almost
every single case, at least one of [the jurors] lied.”84 Once confronted with the
record of arrest or conviction, the jurors conceded the truth. One claimed to have
forgotten the arrest, even though the arrest landed the juror in jail. Another, who
had been convicted of a crime of violence and sentenced to a lengthy jail term,
admitted that he did not want to tell the lawyers about his conviction.85 Wilcox
notes that he is not the only one who has uncovered juror dishonesty. He reports
that earlier in the year, a multimillion-dollar damages award in a civil case was
thrown out and a new trial ordered after the litigants uncovered that three different
jurors engaged in dishonesty during voir dire. Two failed to disclose that they had
been involved in lawsuits. A third disclosed that she had been involved in a lawsuit
Babcock, supra note 65, at 547; see also Broeder, supra note 45, at 511 (describing failure
of jurors to answer questions during voir dire).
80
See Final Juror Questionnaire at 4, United States v. Bonds, 580 F. Supp. 2d 925
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C 07-00732), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/
596/304.pdf.
81
Id.
82
See supra note 23 (listing various cases in which jurors lied or withheld material
information).
83
Elliott Wilcox, Are Jurors Lying to You During the Jury Selection Process?,
TRIALTHEATER.COM, http://www.trialtheater.com/jury-selection/jury-selection-jurors-wholie.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
84
Id.
85
Id.
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but withheld that she had been a defendant in nine other cases.86
Indeed, court decisions and newspaper reports are replete with examples of
juror dishonesty.87
To the extent jurors are engaging in dishonesty, the deception threatens both
the perception and the reality of fair criminal prosecutions. Consider the 2006 trial
of Christopher McCowen, a black man accused of raping and murdering a white
fashion writer on Cape Cod. Following McCowen’s conviction, two jurors
reported that a fellow juror had made racial comments during deliberations
revealing his bias.88 The juror allegedly said that he “did not like blacks because
they cause trouble and that he considered himself white and preferred to socialize
with whites.”89 The juror denied making such comments, but a subsequent
interview with the juror’s great aunt revealed that the juror had made similar
comments many times prior to his jury service. According to the aunt, “Billy has

86

Id. Although these instances of dishonesty occurred in a civil case, there is no
reason to believe that jurors engage in dishonesty less frequently in criminal cases. In fact,
given that criminal cases regularly involve the probing of sensitive topics, it is likely that
the pressure on jurors is greater in criminal cases than in civil cases.
87
See supra note 23; see also Broeder, supra note 45, at 510–15 (noting numerous
examples of juror deception, including a juror in a car accident case who had “only recently
been disfigured in an auto accident, said nothing” when asked about prior involvement with
accidents because she became “too nervous”; another juror, who had previously been
compensated by the defendant’s company “sat mute when plaintiff’s counsel inquired
whether anyone had ever had any business . . . dealings with defendant”; another
“remained silent when asked whether he had ever been involved in a serious auto
accident,” although he had been in an accident in which his wife “was hospitalized for
weeks and his car totally demolished”; another juror promised to try the case solely on the
law and then “spent most of his deliberation time arguing that the ‘jury is a law unto
itself’”); Steve Gonzalez, Carr Claims Juror Lied in Motion for New Med Mal Trial,
MADISON ST. CLAIR REC. (Mar. 13, 2007, 12:18 PM), http://madisonrecord.com/issues/
305-med-mal/191880-carr-claims-juror-lied-in-motion-for-new-med-mal-trial/ (reporting a
lawyer claiming his clients were denied an impartial jury because a juror lied and failed to
disclose that he was a defendant in a lawsuit alleging he ran a stop sign and injured others);
Annie Sweeney, Juror Dropped from Federal Civil Trial After Allegations He Lied About
His Arrest History, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 22, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-0322/news/ct-met-jury-background-checks-20110322_1_juror-jury-selection-civil-trial/ (juror
removed in the middle of a civil trial seeking damages against the city of Chicago based on
allegations of false arrest and police abuse after evidence surfaced that the juror withheld
his arrest record during jury selection); Attorneys: Cop Skipped Jury Duty, Lied on Form,
KDBC.COM (Aug. 18, 2011, 17:13), http://www.kdbc.com/news/attorneys-cop-skippedjury-duty-lied-on-form/ (alleging that a police officer failed to appear for jury duty after
lying on his jury questionnaire when he answered “no” to the question, “Have you ever
been party to a lawsuit excluding divorce?” and failed to indicate that he had been recently
sued for alleged rape of an arrestee).
88
Jonathan Saltzman, Juror’s Kin Says He Lied About Bias, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 19,
2008, at B1.
89
Id.
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talked about black people. . . . He doesn’t like black people.”90 She added that he
had called them “lazy” and had suggested that “[a]ll they do is rob people, kill
them, and deal drugs.”91
Jurors engage in deception for at least three reasons. Some, like the juror in
the McCowen case, lie because they want to be seated and serve on a jury. A
second group lies to avoid appearing in response to the jury summons or, after
appearing and realizing that jury duty may involve some hardship, tells the trial
court of work or family obligations or some other difficulty that requires release
from duty. Finally, at least some jurors lie once subject to voir dire out of
embarrassment, fear, or nervousness, attempting to protect their privacy and the
privacy of those they care about.92 When litigants aggressively question this third
group, they increase the risk that these jurors will hide their true experiences,
beliefs, and leanings to avoid discomfort. Unlike lies told by members of group
two, lies told by those in groups one and three pose a danger to the accused’s
constitutional rights. The accused’s rights are not jeopardized when jurors deceive
to avoid duty altogether, as there is no constitutional right to a particular jury
composition.93 But when jurors fail to disclose information that reflects the jurors’
predispositions toward or against guilt in a particular case, the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury is jeopardized. As explained more in Part IV,
the juror strike proposed in this Article ameliorates the risks posed by group one
and group three’s deception.
Juror dishonesty, even if infrequent, is an egregious problem. In fact, lack of
juror candor was precisely the prosecutor’s concern in Press-Enterprise—the
Supreme Court’s sole pronouncement on juror privacy. There, the State opposed
the media’s motion to keep the jury voir dire open, “arguing that if the press were
present, juror responses would lack the candor necessary to assure a fair trial.”94
And juror dishonesty is not always grounded in animus. Jurors may withhold
relevant and responsive information because they are caught off guard by
surprising questions. Although in a slightly different context, in July of 2005, a
juror declared that she “c[ould]n’t explain why she lied” to a trial judge about
buying two newspapers on a morning that she would be part of jury deliberations
in a murder case.95 Lindy Heaster, a retired Pentagon secretary, was found in
contempt of court and ordered to pay over $21,000 in restitution after the trial
judge declared a mistrial upon learning that Heaster lied about the newspaper
purchase.96 The lawyer for the accused in the underlying criminal case had seen
Heaster at a 7-Eleven near the courthouse on the day of jury deliberations and
90

Id.
Id.
92
See, e.g., supra note 23.
93
Mallett v. Missouri, 494 U.S. 1009, 1011 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that a defendant has “no right to a jury of any particular racial composition”).
94
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984).
95
Stephanie McCrummen, Juror Panicked, Lied to Virginia Judge, WASH. POST, July
6, 2005, at B8.
96
Id.
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noticed a newspaper under her arm.97 Once in court, the judge asked Heaster about
the newspaper, but Heaster denied buying a paper, claiming that she bought coffee.
The lawyer for the accused later obtained a video from the 7-Eleven and a receipt
showing that Heaster had bought The Washington Post and Potomac News.98
Heaster’s lawyer explained later that Heaster “is not someone who was familiar
with the system or sophisticated enough to know that the purchase of the
newspapers in and of itself was not the real issue.”99 Before the newspaper lie,
Heaster had seemingly been a model citizen. She had retired after thirty-one years
serving the Pentagon, the United States Army, and the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development.100 As far as anyone could tell, Heaster had never
violated a law. Arguably, Heaster lied because she was put on the spot in a public
courtroom by a judge, and she did not think carefully about the importance of
telling the truth and the consequences of telling a lie.
The pressure Heaster faced when asked about buying newspapers pales in
comparison to the pressure some jurors feel when asked to answer a question that,
when answered candidly, exposes an embarrassing secret, like rape, incest,
criminal conviction, or bankruptcy.
Despite the personal (and sometimes incriminating) nature of many voir dire
questions, such probing questions are asked every day in courtrooms across the
country. Although judges retain wide discretion to limit the breadth of voir dire,
they typically permit litigants wide-ranging latitude in choosing questions.
Reluctant jurors are sometimes directed to answer under oath and on the record or
face contempt charges, which may involve fines and jail.101 Jurors are not told that
they may skip questions, even when the jurors perceive the questions to be too
personal, emotionally traumatic, or embarrassing.102 When citizens enter the
courthouse to take part in our criminal justice system, they are treated as if they
leave their rights at the courthouse steps.103 When trial courts fail to respect juror
privacy, jurors are pressured to lie and withhold embarrassing facts. That
deception, in turn, undermines the accused’s ability to learn about juror partiality.
97

Id.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (hearing a writ of
habeas corpus issue in which a potential juror of a capital murder case was held in
contempt of court after refusing to answer questions about her income, religious
affiliations, and entertainment and media preferences); Bobb v. Mun. Court, 192 Cal. Rptr.
270, 274 (Ct. App. 1983) (hearing appeal of a potential juror who refused to answer
questions about her husband’s occupation because similar questions were not posed to men
in the jury pool).
102
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). Jurors are usually
told that they may ask for a “private” conference with the judge, the defendant, and the
attorneys, if their answers deserve a more private setting. The “private” conference is
documented by the court reporter, nonetheless.
103
See infra Part II.
98
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In addition to the threat intrusive voir dire questions pose for the accused’s
fair trial rights, such questions also risk alienating large numbers of citizens as they
participate in the justice process.
2. Intrusive Questions Burden Jury Service
Pressing jurors to answer too many personal questions also burdens the
privilege of serving on a jury. Jurors who experience negative feelings about jury
service may not appear the next time they are summonsed, and given the large
number of jurors called for duty each year, society may lose confidence that the
system is fair and workable.104 As the Supreme Court noted in the context of
holding that race-based peremptory strikes violate the Equal Protection Clause:
[An] overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt
over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court . . . . The
voir dire phase of the trial represents the jurors’ first introduction to the
substantive factual and legal issues in a case. The influence of the voir
dire process may persist through the whole course of the trial
proceedings.105
Because jurors play a key role in our democratic process, it makes no sense to
treat them with less respect, giving them fewer legal protections than we give other
participants in the justice process. If police patrolling a public street posed probing
questions like those discussed in Part I.A., to a pedestrian or cyclist, the passerby
should feel comfortable walking (or riding) away without saying one word.106 If
the police lawfully arrested someone, reasonably believing that she had committed
a crime, the accused would have the added protection of Miranda warnings before
police asked any questions, let alone questions like those posed to many potential
jurors.107 If intrusive questions were put to a witness during a criminal trial or
104

One of the reasons given by the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise for public voir
dire was to enhance public confidence in the fair operation of government. See PressEnterprise, 464 U.S. at 507–10.
105
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991) (quoting Gomez v. United States, 490
U.S. 858, 874 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (holding that a police officer
who stops a car on the highway “may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions . . .
[b]ut the detainee is not obliged to respond”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (declaring that ordinarily a citizen has a right to “ignore his interrogator and
walk away”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (“There is nothing in the
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the
streets. Absent special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained or
frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way.”).
107
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that before a statement is
admissible to prove guilt, police must warn a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation
that she has a right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney).
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pretrial hearing, one of the litigant-adversaries in the proceeding would be poised
to timely “object” to the questions as argumentative or irrelevant and to assert
other protective arguments before the witness would be expected to answer.108
Moreover, the accused in a criminal trial cannot be forced to testify, let alone
answer questions.109 The criminal justice system treats jurors differently. Jurors are
simply offered fewer procedural and substantive legal protections than other
criminal justice participants. Jurors must answer questions without the benefit
of counsel, sans Miranda warnings, and with no protective objection from a
litigant’s attorney.
As Albert Alschuler argued in his article criticizing peremptory challenges,
the American criminal justice system has “captured the worst of two worlds,
creating burdensome, unnecessary and ineffective jury controls at the front end of
the criminal trial while failing to implement badly needed controls at the back
end.”110 In explaining the beginning of the trial, Alschuler said: “[W]e subject
jurors to lengthy, privacy-invading voir dire examinations, requiring them to
answer questions that would be considered inappropriate and demeaning in other
contexts.”111 Alschuler is right. As citizens outside the courthouse jurors are
protected from such demeaning inquiries, but once inside, both witnesses and
suspects enjoy more rights.
Like jurors, witnesses are sometimes summonsed to court—to give testimony
linking (or distancing) the accused to (or from) the crime charged. And witnesses,
especially victim witnesses, are occasionally asked to reveal embarrassing
information. One extreme example occurred in LaChappelle v. Moran,112 a case
charging the defendant with attempted rape of his sixteen-year-old daughter. On
cross-examination of the daughter, the defense lawyer asked the girl for a
definition of the words orgasm and climax.113 The judge instructed the girl “of her
obligation to answer the questions posed by defense counsel.”114 When the girl
repeatedly said nothing in response to the questions, the judge called the girl into
his chambers for an ex parte conference and, after learning that she did not want to
answer the lawyer’s questions because of her embarrassment, warned the girl that

108

See FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(3) (giving the trial judge the power to protect witnesses
from “harassment or undue embarrassment”); FED. R. EVID. 402 (declaring that
“[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible”); FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating that when probative
value of evidence is “substantially outweighed” by unfair prejudice or similar concerns,
trial judge may exclude the evidence).
109
The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination and prevents
the government from forcing the accused to testify. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
110
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 154–55 (1989).
111
Id. at 155.
112
699 F.2d 560 (1st Cir. 1983).
113
Id. at 562.
114
Id.
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he would dismiss the case if she did not respond in open court.115 “If you fail to
testify—if you fail to give that answer or give an answer, then you leave the Court
no alternative but to dismiss the case.”116 Eventually, the witness explained her
reluctance to answer: “I meant he come’d.”117 The defense lawyer then concluded
his cross-examination of the girl.118
Although witnesses are occasionally questioned on such sensitive subjects as
in LaChappelle, most are not. Moreover, witnesses who are “friendly” to one
litigant or the other enjoy tips about the process and how to testify effectively.
When the friendly witness testifies, the lawyer for that side leads the witness
through her testimony with a direct examination that gives the witness sign posts to
help tell her story in a logical and believable way. The justice system even treats
“snitch” witnesses—those who agree to testify against the accused in exchange for
some sentencing benefit—better than most jurors. The prosecution thoroughly
prepares these witnesses. Prosecutors may spend hours or even days rehearsing the
tough questions with the snitch witness so that she will be ready to explain her
prior crimes, her pending sentence, and refute her incentives to lie about the
accused’s involvement in the crime. At trial, neither the prosecutor nor the defense
attorney’s questions are surprises. And even the snitch witness is rarely asked to
talk about her sexual orientation, her past sexual abuse, her favorite television
shows, her political contributions, bumper stickers, or the like.
Unlike jurors, witnesses also enjoy some protection from the rules of
evidence, which bar lawyers from abusive and argumentative questions.119 For
instance, when one lawyer probes deeply with a leading question of “Isn’t it true,”
followed by a demand to reveal an embarrassing fact, the opposing lawyer is
usually quick to her feet to stop the witness’s answer with, “Objection!” And when
a litigant calls a witness to give testimony, there is good reason to believe that the
witness will help that litigant’s case. Because of the adversarial push and pull of
the evidence, the lawyer representing one side or the other has a strong incentive to
protect the witness from the disclosure of confidential or privileged
communications. Protecting the witness, in turn, protects the lawyer’s client.
The adversarial nature of trial gives no comparable protection for juror
privacy. Neither the accused nor the prosecutor has a strong incentive to protect a
juror from talking too much or from offering information that will give insight into
the juror’s leanings. One of the only protections jurors enjoy from the adversarial
proceedings rests in the lawyer’s concern that jurors who are treated badly during
voir dire or who watch as others are mishandled will hold a grudge, if seated on the
jury. Justice Blackmun relied on this theory in Press-Enterprise, arguing that “in
most cases, [a juror’s interest in privacy] can be fully protected through the
interests of the defendant and the State in encouraging his full cooperation.”120
115

Id. at 562–63.
Id. at 563.
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Id. at 564.
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FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
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464 U.S. 501, 516 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
116

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2033885

2012]

JUROR PRIVACY IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BALANCE

2047

Nevertheless, any incentive for lawyers to treat jurors cautiously is lessened
substantially because only a few jurors will survive voir dire. If a juror exhibits
hostility or dissatisfaction with either side, that juror is virtually certain to be
removed from the panel with a peremptory strike. Jurors enjoy no other
representation of their rights through the adversarial process. The many examples
in Part I.A, in which jurors have been asked exceedingly personal questions,
demonstrate this point.121
The probing questioning of jurors is perhaps most conspicuous when
compared to the justice system’s handling of criminal suspects. When the police
take a suspect into custody to question her, police are obligated to warn the suspect
that anything she says may be used against her to prove her guilt. The suspect is
told that she has the right to a lawyer and that she has the right to remain silent.122
Even suspected criminals who are never arrested enjoy more rights and protections
than jurors. These suspects are not entitled to Miranda warnings, which are
triggered by “custodial interrogation,”123 but they remain free to tell the police that
they think the questioning is too personal. The government may not legally force
such suspects to talk.124
Similarly, when police believe that they have good reason to invade
someone’s home or car to search for contraband, or to listen in on a private
conversation via a wire tap, the police are forced to seek prior judicial approval for
their intrusions with a written application supported by sworn law enforcement
testimony explaining why the intrusion is reasonable.125 Granted, in the voir dire
situation, the trial judge is present to screen questions that become too intrusive,
but the process is more laissez-faire, often developing as the lawyer thinks of
follow-up questions. Additionally, the standard the judge uses to evaluate the
propriety of a question is relevance, meaning that the question is appropriate if it
bears “any tendency” to show juror bias—a heavily discretion-dependent standard
that favors any and all questions.126 The trial judges’ virtually unbridled discretion
is also subject to no real appellate review. Although a juror technically could
appeal from a judge’s ruling on the propriety of a question, the juror would have to
be unusually sophisticated to mount such an appeal and would win nothing of
substance should she prevail. By the time the appellate court declared that the trial
judge should have protected the juror from a question, the trial would have
concluded.
Like a juror excluded because of her race, a venireperson excluded after
having been forced to reveal intensely personal and sensitive information may
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See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68.
123
Id. at 439, 444.
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See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 n.12 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
125
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. 3, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516–
18 (2006).
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FED. R. EVID. 401.
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“suffer[] a profound personal humiliation heightened by its public character.”127
Also like the juror struck for her race, the juror who is embarrassed before her
removal from the venire “may lose confidence in the court and its verdict.”128 But
unlike the juror who suffers a race-based peremptory strike, who may find an
advocate in the opposing counsel, the juror who seeks to protect her privacy will
be left to assert her own rights and pursue her own appeal or seek other
legal protection.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “The barriers to a suit by an excluded
juror are daunting.”129 Jurors have little or no chance to be heard on objections to
the lawyers’ voir dire questions during the questioning period.130 They cannot
easily obtain declaratory or injunctive relief when they are treated improperly or
forced to answer abusive or irrelevant questions, because it will be virtually
impossible for the juror to show that the abuse will recur.131 There are numerous
“practical barriers” to such a suit too.132 A juror would have to represent herself or
hire a lawyer. Because of the small financial stake, it is unlikely that she would
convince a lawyer to take the case on a contingency fee basis. And because the
parameters of jurors’ rights to privacy are debatable,133 lawyers might well decide
that the low likelihood of any recovery weighs against taking the case. As with the
juror who is struck for race-based reasons, a juror whose privacy has been
infringed during voir dire will probably “leave the courtroom possessing little
incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own
rights.”134 As Alschuler said of jurors who suffer race and gender-based
peremptory strikes:
Although an unusually assertive juror might demand a hearing on the
propriety of his or her exclusion, the predictable judicial response would
be one of rejection—probably one of astonished rejection. The court
would reply that a juror may not interrupt an ongoing criminal
proceeding to demand a hearing simply because the juror’s own rights
may have been violated. In accordance with customary practice, jurors
should speak only when spoken to.135
Aschuler has also argued, “Once a jury has been empaneled, the violation of an
excluded juror’s rights is complete, and no remedy can prevent the wrong. In the
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Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413–14 (1991).
Id. at 414.
129
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 415 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–10 (1983)).
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Id.
133
See discussion infra Part II.
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Powers, 499 U.S. at 415; Alschuler, supra note 110, at 193–95.
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Alschuler, supra note 110, at 194.
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unlikely event that an excluded juror sought a remedy . . . she would fail. It plainly
would be too late . . . .”136
While jurors play a critical role in our system of criminal justice, the current
voir dire process poses significant risks to our constitutional scheme, including
the jury’s civic right to participate in our democratic process. Jurors are
treated as though their rights are left behind at the courthouse door. Thus,
increasingly, public, probing voir dire burdens the constitutional protections
afforded the accused and alienates some citizens who participate in the democratic
process of justice.
II. JURORS ENJOY LEGAL RIGHTS
This Part first establishes that jurors retain some legal protections during voir
dire before turning to the more debatable subject of privacy rights and, in
particular, the privacy rights of jurors. Although the harsh treatment some jurors
receive during voir dire might suggest otherwise, potential jurors do retain legal
rights throughout the voir dire process. Batson v. Kentucky137 and its progeny
establish undeniably that jurors keep their equal protection rights,138 for example.
In Batson, the prosecutor used his peremptory strikes to remove all four black
jurors on the venire, and an all-white jury was selected.139 The defendant in the
case objected.140 The Supreme Court held that jurors suffer a violation of equal
protection when excluded from the privilege of jury service because of race.141
Subsequent decisions extended the Batson holding to gender and national origin.142
Jurors subjected to such discriminatory exclusion “have the legal right to bring suit
on their own behalf.”143 As the Court noted in condemning such race-based strikes,
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Id.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
138
Id. at 84.
139
Id. at 82–83.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 88; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (applying the holding in Batson, and
explaining, “[A] prosecutor’s discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the
excluded jurors and the community at large”) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 87).
142
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128–29 (1994) (prohibiting gender
discrimination in peremptory strikes); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991)
(applying the three-step Batson process to determine whether jurors were struck because
they were Latino).
143
Powers, 499 U.S. at 414. Nevertheless, the barriers to such a suit are “daunting.”
Id. Similarly, a prospective juror who refuses to participate in voir dire because of a sincere
religious belief that she may not sit in judgment of others may not be held in contempt. In
re Jemison, 375 U.S. 14, 14 (1963) (vacating a Supreme Court of Minnesota opinion
affirming a contempt charge for a juror who refused to participate in voir dire because of
her religious beliefs); see also Bobb v. Mun. Court, 192 Cal. Rptr. 270, 277 (Ct. App.
1983) (concluding that in California a juror may not be held in contempt of court for
refusing to give her spouse’s occupation when male prospective jurors were not asked to
137
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practices that “cast[] doubt on the integrity of the judicial process” simultaneously
“place[] the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt.”144 Because all too often
the parties in criminal cases unduly invade prospective jurors’ privacy while
attempting to uncover potential bias, this probing, in the aggregate, pressures jurors
to lie and to withhold information about their beliefs and prejudices, also casting
doubt on the fairness of criminal proceedings. As with peremptory strikes that rest
on the color of a juror’s skin or her gender, unduly infringing on juror privacy
“damages both the fact and the perception” of the jury’s role—that of “a vital
check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and its prosecutors.”145
Perhaps because protecting juror privacy protects the integrity of the justice
system, in Press-Enterprise the Supreme Court described jury privacy as a
“compelling interest.”146 But, the dicta from that same decision, as well as the
Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence generally, leave a juror’s privacy rights
uncertain.147 The next section addresses the Court’s privacy jurisprudence
generally before considering juror privacy.
A. Privacy Rights, Generally
The uncertain status of juror privacy begins with the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to define such rights in contexts outside of voir dire. Recently, in
National Aeronautics & Space Administration v. Nelson,148 a majority of the Court
declined to confirm that anyone can claim constitutional protection for private
information.149 In Nelson, the Court was asked to declare that a government
background check of federal contractors violated the employee’s constitutional
rights to privacy.150 The federal contractors of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory
were not subjected to background checks when hired, but then-President George
W. Bush directed that uniform policies be adopted for federal employees and
federal civil servants.151 As part of the new policy, contract employees were
required to undergo an extensive background check.152 The Court refused to decide
give their spouses’ occupations). Courts have yet to decide if jurors may refuse to answer
voir dire questions on nonreligious grounds, such as “principle.”
144
Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
145
Id.
146
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984).
147
Id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“We need not decide . . . whether a juror,
called upon to answer questions posed to him in court during voir dire, has a legitimate
expectation, rising to the status of a privacy right, that he will not have to answer those
questions.”) (citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs, 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977), and Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
148
131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
149
See id. at 751. Justice Alito wrote for the majority. Joining him were Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justices Scalia and
Thomas concurred in the judgment. Justice Kagan took no part in the decision.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 752.
152
Id. at 752–53.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2033885

2012]

JUROR PRIVACY IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BALANCE

2051

the employees’ claim that they held a constitutionally protected right to
information responsive to questions asked in the background check, stating: “In
two cases decided more than 30 years ago, this Court referred broadly to a
constitutional privacy ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’ . . . We
assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort
mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.”153
The Court raised doubts about informational privacy in Nelson, but the doubts
are not new. There has been a long-running debate on the Court about privacy
rights. Because a “right to privacy” is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution,
for decades members of the Court and constitutional law scholars have questioned
the source and reach of such a right.154 The Court’s decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut155 is often a starting point for the discussion. That decision suggests at
least six potential constitutional sources for privacy. Writing for the Court, Justice
Douglas identified five.156 In his words, “Various [constitutional] guarantees create
zones of privacy.”157 Justice Douglas noted the First,158 Third,159 Fourth,160 Fifth,161
and Ninth Amendments162 as creating some privacy protection. Justice Goldberg,
concurring, suggested that rather than originating with any one particular
153

Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 751. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Court
recognized an individual’s interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters but did
not find the rights of the plaintiffs’ privacy infringed. Id. at 599–600, 605. In Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), former President Nixon
challenged the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act in an effort to protect from disclosure papers and tape recordings created during his
presidency, but the Court denied protection. Id. at 605. While the Court’s majority in
Nelson skirted the informational privacy issue, Justices Scalia and Thomas were ready to
deny such privacy rights outright. See Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763–64. They wrote separately,
“A federal Constitutional right to ‘informational privacy’ does not exist.” Nelson, 131 S.
Ct. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring).
154
See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598 (debating and discussing “two different”
privacy interests); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129, 152 (1973) (discussing the historical,
individual right of privacy in the context of a woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy).
155
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
156
Id. at 484–85. The numerous concurring opinions showed a wide divide in the
Court’s reasoning.
157
Id. at 484.
158
Id. (“The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment
is one . . . .”).
159
Prohibiting the quartering of soldiers in any house “is another facet of” privacy. Id.
160
Id. at 485. The Fourth Amendment creates a right of privacy “no less important
than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people.” Id. (citing Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)).
161
Id. at 484 (“The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment.”).
162
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing U.S. CONST. amend IX) (“The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”).
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constitutional source, “the right of privacy is a fundamental personal right,
emanating ‘from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.’”163
Justice Harlan, on the other hand, pinpointed the Due Process Clause as the
substantive source of privacy protection.164 Justice White looked to the Due
Process Clause too, but believed that protection for privacy turned on procedural,
rather than substantive, process.165
Although the Griswold decision demonstrates disagreement about the specific
constitutional source of a right to privacy, it expressly recognized privacy
protection. But Griswold offers only limited insights for the juror privacy debate.
Griswold considered married couples’ rights to make decisions about the use of
contraceptives, a matter related to personal decision making in the bedroom.
Although truthful answers to voir dire questions may expose the use of
contraception or similar practices bearing on jurors’ sexual intimacy, the voir dire
process requires a post-hoc review of such practices. Discussing such practices
after the fact arguably does not burden a personal choice as heavily or directly.
Perhaps in recognition of the material differences in types of privacy, in cases
following Griswold, the Court has divided the issues into two broad categories:
“One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.”166 The Court has never categorized juror privacy using those terms, but
given the options, privacy for jurors during voir dire fits most comfortably within
the first category, informational privacy.
The model precedent for informational disclosure privacy is Whalen v. Roe,167
cited with some skepticism in Nelson. In Whalen, the Supreme Court expressly
recognized an individual’s “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”
but, as in the decision-making and jury-privacy contexts, it failed to define the
coverage of such rights.168 In fact, although it specifically acknowledged such a
163

Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
165
Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
166
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1977) (citation omitted). As Justice Stevens
noted in Whalen, Philip Kurland identified three facets of a constitutional right of privacy:
(1) “the right of the individual to be free in his private affairs from governmental
surveillance and intrusion,” (2) “the right of an individual not to have his private affairs
made public by the government,” and (3) “the right of an individual to be free in action,
thought, experience, and belief from governmental compulsion.” Id. at 600 n.24 (citing
Philip B. Kurland, The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy and the Constitution, U.
CHI. MAG. 7, 8 (1976)); see also Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct.
746, 755 (2011) (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. 589) (noting that cases characterized as
protecting privacy involve at least two kinds of interests: an interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters and an interest in making certain kinds of important decisions).
167
429 U.S. 589.
168
See id. at 599–602. Justice Stewart, concurring, asserted that “there is no ‘general
constitutional right to privacy.’” Id. at 607–08 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967)); see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 977 (7th ed. 2004) (“The Supreme Court has not yet
164
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privacy interest, the Court did not extend privacy protection to the plaintiffs—
physicians and patients who challenged a New York statute requiring doctors to
give a copy of prescriptions for certain drugs to the state’s department of health.169
In addition to revealing other information, the prescriptions identified the
prescribing doctor, the drug, and the name, address, and age of each patient.170 The
Court in Whalen was convinced that privacy was not infringed too much because
the statute required the government recipients to protect the information from
further disclosure, including keeping the prescriptions in a locked room.171
As in Nelson and Griswold, the Whalen decision exposed disagreement within
the Court about the origin of a right of privacy. A majority in Whalen said, but did
not hold, that a right to protect information from disclosure “arguably has its roots
in the Constitution.”172 Where exactly that right can be found in the Constitution
was left unanswered. Justice Brennan, concurring in Whalen, agreed that the
Constitution offered protection for individual privacy against extensive
governmental data collection.173 On the other hand, Justice Stewart174 said that
aside from Fourth Amendment privacy, the Constitution provides no such right.175
Thus, over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court started an intense debate about
whether the Federal Constitution provides privacy protection and if so, the reach of
the protection. That debate is ongoing and has implications for protecting jurors
from questions probing their biases and beliefs.
B. Juror Privacy
The Court’s ongoing debate about privacy rights leaves jurors’ privacy in
doubt. The one Supreme Court decision addressed to jury privacy did little to
clarify the area of law. Though the Court has recently reiterated that “sometimes
there [will be] exceptions to [the] general rule” of public voir dire,176 a Court
majority has failed to explain whether juror privacy can provide such an exception
and, if so, when. In dicta, the Court has made reference to jurors’ important, indeed
“compelling,” privacy interests. In Press-Enterprise, the majority opinion stated:
“The jury selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling
interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal
held that the right to privacy limits governmental powers relating to the collection of data
concerning private individuals.”).
169
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593–95, 599–600.
170
Id. at 593.
171
Id. at 593–94, 605.
172
Id. at 605.
173
See id. at 606–07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
174
Id. at 607–09 (Stewart, J., concurring).
175
Id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 168, at 978 n.13, 979 n.14
(describing the Supreme Court’s failure to decide issues of “privacy regarding personal
data” and citing specific examples such as Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. 425 (1977), and California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)).
176
See Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724 (2010).
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matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain.”177
The Court explained further:
[A] prospective juror might privately inform the judge that she, or a
member of her family, had been raped but had declined to seek
prosecution because of the embarrassment and emotional trauma from
the very disclosure of the episode. The privacy interests of such a
prospective juror must be balanced against the historic values we have
discussed and the need for openness of the process.178
Although the Court in Press-Enterprise appeared to accept that jurors hold a
compelling interest in privacy, as Justice Blackmun indicated in his concurring
opinion, the Court did not delineate “the asserted ‘right to privacy of the
prospective jurors.’”179 In fact, Press-Enterprise did not require any analysis of
juror privacy. The Court granted certiorari on the limited issue of whether the
guarantees of public proceedings in criminal trials extend to the voir dire stage of a
case.180 The majority assumed that jurors “had protectible privacy interests in some
of their answers.”181
Unlike the majority, Justice Blackmun was concerned that protecting juror
privacy would disrupt trial court proceedings. On this point, he wrote:
I am concerned that recognition of a juror’s privacy “right” would
unnecessarily complicate the lives of trial judges attempting to conduct a
voir dire proceeding. Could a juror who disagreed with a trial judge’s
determination that he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in certain
information refuse to answer without a promise of confidentiality until
some superior tribunal declared his expectation unreasonable? Could a
juror ever refuse to answer a highly personal, but relevant, question,
on the ground that his privacy right outweighed the defendant’s
need to know?182
Justice Blackmun concluded that in most cases, a juror’s interest in privacy will be
“protected through the interests of the defendant and the State in encouraging [the
177

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984). PressEnterprise did not require analysis of juror privacy. The Court granted certiorari on the
limited issue of whether the guarantees of public proceedings in criminal trials extend to
the voir dire examination of potential jurors. Id. at 503. The Court majority assumed that
jurors “had protectible privacy interests in some of their answers,” probably because the
trial court had relied, in part, on that justification in closing a significant portion of the voir
dire proceedings. Id. at 513.
178
Id. at 512.
179
Id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
180
Id. at 503 (majority opinion).
181
Id. at 513; see id. at 510.
182
Id. at 515 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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juror’s] full cooperation.”183 The Court has never returned to this issue of
protecting juror privacy and has never rejected Justice Blackmun’s view. But
modern voir dire establishes that whatever privacy rights a juror has during
the voir dire stage of a public trial, those rights are rarely guarded by the
adversarial nature of the proceedings or by the litigants’ interests in encouraging
juror cooperation.184
Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Marshall wrote separately in Press-Enterprise
“to stress that the constitutional rights of the public and press to access to all
aspects of criminal trials are not diminished in cases in which ‘deeply personal
matters’ are likely to be elicited in voir dire proceedings.”185 In Justice Marshall’s
view, “Only in the most extraordinary circumstances can the substance of a juror’s
response to questioning at voir dire be permanently excluded from the salutary
scrutiny of the public and the press.”186 Justice Marshall did not provide an
example of sufficiently extraordinary circumstances. But Justices Blackmun and
Marshall did not express these doubts about juror privacy in a case with benign
facts. The Press-Enterprise case involved “the rape and strangulation killing
of a fifteen year old white schoolgirl on her way to school, by a black man
twenty-six years of age, with a prior conviction of forcible rape on an adolescent
[C]aucasian girl.”187
One writer argued when analyzing Press-Enterprise:
[T]he Court has placed not merely its finger, but its entire weight on the
scales to tip the balance in the direction that will best preserve the
defendant’s right to a fair trial. This bias in favor of the defendant’s sixth
amendment right is firmly established by the Court’s language in the
line of decisions culminating in Press-Enterprise and by the
policy underpinnings for protection of the public right of access to
criminal proceedings.188
The author concluded, “[T]he Court implies that any privacy interest [of
jurors] will be subordinated in deference to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”189
This idea that juror privacy competes with an accused’s right to a fair trial and
impartial jury, and is necessarily subordinate, may have begun with the dicta from
Press-Enterprise, but it continues to permeate the scholarly literature and decisions
from the lower courts. Trial courts routinely require jurors to answer probing

183

Id. at 516.
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
185
Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring).
186
Id. at 520–21.
187
Id. at 521 n.1.
188
Michael P. Malak, Note, First Amendment—Guarantee of Public Access to Voir
Dire, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 583, 600–01 (1984).
189
Id. at 601.
184
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questions, concluding that the rights of the accused and the public require the
subordination of the privacy interests of jurors.190
A majority of the Supreme Court has never suggested that either Justice
Blackmun or Justice Marshall was correct—that recognizing juror privacy would
unduly complicate the smooth trial process or that jurors should be protected only
in the most extraordinary circumstances. But neither has the Court specifically held
that jurors enjoy privacy rights during voir dire or that jurors’ rights are on the
same footing as the accused’s rights or the rights of the public. As a consequence
of the Court’s failure to delineate the privacy rights of prospective jurors, trial
courts have stressed the interests of the litigants (especially the rights of the
accused) and the interests of the public, at the expense of jurors’ privacy
interests.191 This litigant-focused analysis burdens the democratic privilege of jury
service, a significant cost to justice. But more importantly, it encourages jurors to
engage in dishonesty by pressuring them to answer personal questions on the
record, in front of other jurors and spectators. Encouraging juror dishonesty has the
perverse result of burdening the accused’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, rather than supporting them. Juror dishonesty during voir dire creates a
significant risk that the accused will glean a distorted view of juror biases,
undermining the likelihood that she will select an impartial jury. Thus,
jeopardizing jurors’ interests in privacy not only harms the individual juror and the
integrity of the jury selection process, but it also tends to compromise the
accused’s constitutional rights.
III. REENVISIONING JURORS’ PRIVACY AS A COMPLEMENT TO
THE ACCUSED’S RIGHTS
Despite the Supreme Court’s failure to delineate a juror’s privacy rights and
the Court’s murky privacy jurisprudence generally, a majority of legal scholars
have concluded that jurors enjoy privacy “interests,” if not rights, during voir

190

See discussion supra Part I.B.1; see also Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724
(2010) (“The right to an open trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests,
such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting
disclosure of sensitive information.” (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984)));
United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991) (showing that as long as the
trial court protects the defendant’s fundamental rights, it may use anonymous jury to
protect jurors); Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 171 (Mass. 1993) (finding that
trial court erred by closing voir dire for sensitive questions); State v. Strode, 217 P.3d 310,
316 (Wash. 2009) (same); Weinstein, supra note 48, at 16 (noting that trial courts have
“frequently upheld questioning on . . . sensitive matters,” such as “religious affiliation”).
191
See Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. 501; Strode, 217 P.3d 310; State v. Banks, No.
60153-9-I, 2010 WL 5464742 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2010). Not uncommonly, a
convicted defendant later wins a new trial based on such closure. See, e.g., Banks, No.
60153-9-I, 2010 WL 5464742.
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dire.192 In addition to legal scholars who believe that jurors enjoy constitutional or
other legal protections for their privacy, a few courts have found such
protection.193 Courts and scholars alike have, nevertheless, uniformly viewed the
juror’s interest in privacy and the accused’s interest in a fair trial and impartial jury
as conflicting. While most scholars concur that prospective jurors are entitled to
some privacy, they also agree that privacy requires further analysis of the interplay
between the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the juror’s need for protection.194

192

Although not directed to juror privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued
in a Harvard Law Review article in 1890 that the common law gave each individual a right
to privacy to “determin[e], ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others.” Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 198; see
also Michael R. Glover, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During Voir Dire, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 708, 711 (1982) (“Whalen and Nixon thus establish that an individual has a
constitutional right to privacy that protects him from the compelled disclosure of personal
matters with respect to which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Hannaford,
supra note 32, at 20 (noting that while a detailed discussion of case law of juror privacy is
outside the article’s scope, “[s]uffice it to say that the general rule is that jurors do have a
qualified right to privacy”); Marc O. Litt, “Citizen Soldiers” or Anonymous Justice:
Reconciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the
Media and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 371, 372 n.8 (1992)
(asserting that the Supreme Court first recognized privacy rights of jurors in PressEnterprise, 464 U.S. 501); Weinstein, supra note 48, at 9 (concluding after a discussion of
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. 501, and Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), that “jurors have a constitutionally protected right against
disclosure of private information”); Sara Zweig, Medical Privacy and Voir Dire: Going
Beyond Doctor and Patient, DCBA BRIEF (April 2010), http://www.dcbabrief.org/
vol220410art1.html (citing Michael Glover’s comment and asserting that an individual has
a right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment and that jurors do not lose their
reasonable expectation of privacy when serving as jurors). But see Karen Monsen, Privacy
for Prospective Jurors at What Price? Distinguishing Privacy Rights from Privacy
Interests; Rethinking Procedures to Protect Privacy in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 REV.
LITIGATION 285, 288, 291, 295 (2002) (asserting that there is no constitutional right to
privacy and describing Michael Glover’s assertion that there is such a right as “flawed,”
but arguing that “jurors have privacy interests in certain matters”).
193
Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Tex. 1995); People v. James, 710
N.E.2d 484, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
194
See, e.g., Glover, supra note 192, at 712–23 (arguing that courts should balance
the rights of jurors against the rights of parties); Litt, supra note 192, at 373–74 (analyzing
how the competing interests interact); Malak, supra note 188, at 601 (arguing that the
Court in Press-Enterprise implied that “any privacy interest will be subordinated in
deference to the defendant’s right to a fair trial”); Zweig, supra note 192, at 16 (“Protection
of juror privacy is important. But it must be balanced against a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights.”); North Dakota Supreme Court Review, 85 N.D. L. REV. 503, 513
(2009) (“[T]he public and media have a presumptive right of access to juror questionnaires
that is not absolute and that must be balanced against both a defendant’s right to a fair trial
and jurors’ privacy interests.”).
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Because the Supreme Court has failed to explain how juror rights fit together
with the accused’s rights and the public’s rights to an open proceeding,195 trial
courts—like scholars—have uniformly viewed the rights of jurors as subordinate
to, and competing against, the other sets of rights.196 The Press-Enterprise decision
is probably responsible for this misguided conclusion. In Press-Enterprise, the
government sought to exclude the public and press from voir dire of potential
jurors, concerned that voir dire with the media present would result in juror
responses that “lack the candor necessary to assure a fair trial.”197 The trial judge
closed the voir dire to the public except for approximately three days.198 When the
media sought the transcript of the voir dire, counsel for the defense argued against
release, citing juror privacy.199 The government joined the defense’s argument,
noting that jurors had answered questions “under an ‘implied promise of
confidentiality.’”200
In the Supreme Court’s later reversal of the California appellate court’s denial
of the media’s writ of mandate to compel the trial court to release a transcript of
voir dire, the Supreme Court emphasized the rights of “adversaries”—the accused
and the prosecution—as well as the rights of the public to access public trials over
the rights of the prospective jurors.201 The Court explained further:
[H]ow we allocate the “right” to openness as between the accused and
the public, or whether we view it as a component inherent in the system
benefiting both, is not crucial. No right ranks higher than the right of the
accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused’s right is difficult
to separate from the right of everyone in the community to attend the
voir dire which promotes fairness.202
Elsewhere in Press-Enterprise, the Court said, “Where the state attempts to deny
the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must
be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and
195

At best, the Court’s decision in Press-Enterprise suggested that jurors’ privacy
interests should be evaluated in comparison to the public and accused’s rights. See PressEnterprise, 464 U.S. at 512 (stating that interests of prospective jurors “must be balanced
against” other values).
196
See, e.g., Galjour v. Rodrigue, No. 10-704, 2011 WL 1750677, at *6–7 (E.D. La.
2011); Brandborg, 891 F. Supp. at 356 (“The search for an impartial juror is a balancing
effort by the court between the competing parties, the public and the potential juror.”);
State v. Applegate, 259 P.3d 311, 317 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he [court has a]
constitutional obligation to balance a defendant’s right to a public trial and a juror’s privacy
interest[s] . . . .”).
197
Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 503.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 504.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 505.
202
Id. at 508.
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is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”203 Even though the trial judge had
closed voir dire to protect juror privacy and the defense had argued against release
of a transcript of the closed portions, the Supreme Court focused on the public’s
right to access and on the litigants’ right to information.204
The jury selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to
a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches
on deeply personal matters . . . . [but] [t]he privacy interests of such a
prospective juror must be balanced against the historic values we have
discussed and the need for openness of the process.205
While the Court’s reference to jurors’ privacy interests has led trial courts to
conduct a multi-interest balancing analysis to determine whether and how to
protect juror privacy, the Supreme Court’s subsequent cases and the lower courts’
interpretation of Press-Enterprise have also resulted in the perception that juror
privacy necessarily and consistently competes against, and becomes subordinate
to, the accused’s interests in a fair trial and an impartial jury.206 This approach fails
to account for the impartial jury’s critical role in a defendant’s fair-trial right. As
the Court has acknowledged in other contexts, the guarantee of a public trial is
“created for the benefit of the defendant.”207
Scholars, too, have viewed juror privacy as a minor factor of several
in a balance of pertinent interests. For example, Professor Joseph Colquitt has
argued that:
There are four facets to an appropriate balancing of the rights and
interests [of jurors]. First, the court’s action is limited by its authority.
Second, the court must address and uphold the rights of the parties . . . .
Third, the court must consider and protect the rights of the public
and the press. Fourth, the court must weigh and preserve the rights
of the jurors.208

203

Id. at 510 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
606–07 (1982)).
204
See id.
205
Id. at 511–12 (emphasis added).
206
See supra notes, 190–191, 195–196 and accompanying text.
207
See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (quoting Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)) (considering whether the accused’s rights under the
Sixth Amendment extended to the closure of a suppression hearing); see also Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1966) (pervasive and prejudicial publicity that
accompanied accused’s prosecution for wife’s murder violated his right to a fair trial
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause); Litt, supra note 192, at 375 (noting that the
accused’s right to a fair trial “outranks the media’s First Amendment right of access”).
208
Colquitt, supra note 53, at 46.
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David Weinstein has said that “jurors have a constitutionally protected right
against disclosure of private information,” adding that the “scope of this right can
only be gauged . . . when viewed in conjunction with other interests at stake during
trial.”209 According to Weinstein, “The right to trial by an impartial jury and the
public’s First Amendment right of access to the courts narrow the protections that
can be given to jurors against inquiry into, and dissemination of, information on
their personal lives.”210
Similarly, Scott Sholder argues that when courts decide whether the press
may access the names, identities, and addresses of potential and seated jurors, they
“weigh and balance the First Amendment rights of the press, the Sixth Amendment
rights of the defendant, the privacy concerns of the jurors, and numerous policy
considerations.”211 Sholder views the weight of each interest differently, depending
on the stage of the case. Before the trial starts, Sholder gives the press’s interests
less significance and the accused and jurors’ rights more weight.212 According to
Sholder, the relative interests shift during the trial.
Like Sholder, Marc Litt views the weight of the balance of interests
differently pretrial than during trial. Litt sees the rights as flexible, not stagnant:
“[T]he accused’s right to a fair trial reigns supreme prior to trial, the media’s right
of access to the identities of jurors increases in weight as the trial progresses.”213
As with other scholars and the courts, Litt has also described the various interests
as in tension with each other: “Over the past twenty-five years, the Sixth
Amendment right of an accused to a fair criminal trial, the First Amendment right
of the media to gather and publish news and the privacy right of jurors have come
into increasing conflict.”214
Although courts and scholars alike have typically viewed the accused’s
constitutional rights and jurors’ privacy rights as an either-or proposition, the
growing risk of juror dishonesty during voir dire reveals the flaw in this
understanding. As Weinstein noted in Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy,
“[T]he protection of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is not always in
conflict with a juror’s privacy rights.”215 Indeed, this Article contends that
209

Weinstein, supra note 48, at 9 (penning his article, as a law clerk to United States
District Court Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr.); see also Litt, supra note 192, at 389 (noting
that while the public has a “qualified right of access to such basic information about the
administration of justice, this right may sometimes be overcome by a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial, or even by a juror’s right to privacy”).
210
Weinstein, supra note 48, at 50.
211
Scott J. Sholder, “What’s in a Name?”: A Paradigm Shift from Press-Enterprise to
Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions When Considering the Release of Juror-Identifying
Information in Criminal Trials, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 99 (2009). When he authored this
article, Mr. Sholder was a law student at Seton Hall Law School.
212
Id. at 106–09.
213
Litt, supra note 192, at 373. Mr. Litt was a student at Columbia Law School when
he authored this article.
214
Id. at 371.
215
Weinstein, supra note 48, at 11.
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jurors’ privacy interests are a necessary complement of the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights.
When scholars and courts view the rights of the accused and the rights of
jurors as in conflict, jurors’ interests in privacy are necessarily treated as
subordinate. Weinstein explained: “An individual’s right to refrain from revealing
personal information is well-entrenched in constitutional jurisprudence . . . . [but]
in current jury selection practice, this right is often made secondary to the parties’
desire for information from prospective jurors . . . .”216 Weinstein acknowledged
that “the constitutional rights of jurors on voir dire are intertwined with the rights
of the public and criminal defendants to be present at the proceedings or to be able
to obtain information disclosed therein.”217 This Article takes an even stronger
position, arguing that respecting juror privacy is a necessary component of
protecting the defendant’s right to an impartial jury and fair trial.
The accused’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and her Sixth
Amendment guarantee to an impartial jury are undermined when jurors are
pressured to lie or withhold information: “[T]he chief function of our judicial
machinery is to ascertain the truth.”218 As the Court noted in Estes v. Texas,219
when evaluating the impact of televising criminal trial proceedings,
“[e]mbarrassment may impede the search for the truth.”220 Although the Court in
Estes was referring to the quality of witness testimony, the same holds true when
potential jurors are embarrassed by voir dire questions. When jurors feel nervous
or embarrassed, they often withhold information or provide false responses
material to their biases.221 When jurors withhold and deceive during voir dire,
rather than striking jurors based on their actual and perceived biases, criminal
defendants may select jurors whose real biases are hidden and distorted.222 Thus,
an accused’s right to an impartial jury is thwarted when she is prevented from
posing questions that will reveal relevant juror bias but also when the judge allows
the litigants to probe a juror’s secrets so aggressively that the juror hides or distorts
her true leanings. In both instances, the accused’s constitutional rights are placed in
doubt, as is the integrity of the jury system. Accordingly, protecting juror privacy
also protects the accused’s constitutional rights; therefore, courts should make
greater efforts to ensure such privacy. The accused in Press-Enterprise implicitly
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This assertion is based on common sense but also supported by the limited
empirical evidence of voir dire dishonesty. See supra note 54. It is also true in other
contexts. See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 918–19 (2006) (arguing that the
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only information that reflects well on its operations).
222
See Broeder, supra note 45, at 510–21.
217

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2033885

2062

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

(if not explicitly) acknowledged the importance of juror honesty to his own fairtrial rights when he argued for closure of the voir dire proceedings.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO PROTECT JUROR PRIVACY WHILE PROMOTING
THE ACCUSED’S RIGHTS
Scholars have often chided the justice system for abusing jurors, but no one
has offered a workable solution to protect jurors’ privacy and the accused’s rights,
while respecting the constitutional demands for a public trial. This Part offers a
procedural change to voir dire that will serve all of these interests—a juror strike.
And the solution may be adopted by individual judges or on a broader scale.
A. A Juror’s Own Strike
Jurors are an imperative and constitutional part of our criminal justice system.
Yet it is growing more and more difficult to ensure that jurors appear in sufficient
numbers to sit for criminal cases.223 When jurors do appear ready to serve, they are
often confronted with attorneys who aggressively probe their lives and
experiences, and challenge their beliefs. Many jurors may not mind; others find the
experience humiliating, embarrassing, even maddening.224 Usually, jurors who
suffer embarrassment will be struck for cause because of their experiences, the
same experiences that create discomfort and humiliation in the first place.225 Thus,
it is common for a litigant to strike a juror from a venire only after the juror has
suffered the personal indignity of revealing a secret, making the process
unpleasant.226 If, for example, a potential juror has been the victim of rape or
incest, and the defendant is on trial for rape or any other violent crime, when the
juror reveals her past, she is virtually certain to be struck, either for cause or with a
peremptory challenge.227 The strike occurs only after the juror has relived the
victimization on the public record and in front of the accused and other onlookers.
223

See supra note 1–2 and accompanying text.
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At least some jurors lie to avoid such public embarrassment.228 When the
embarrassed juror is subsequently struck, the accused’s trial rights are honored, but
the juror’s interests are neglected. In the second instance, when the juror lies,
neither the accused nor the juror’s interests are served. To protect both sets of
rights, every juror should hold the power to avoid such uncomfortable and
unproductive rituals. Each juror should be permitted to exercise her own jury
strike, if a question is asked that will result in her disgrace, humiliation, or
embarrassment, when answered honestly. Empowering a juror to remove herself
from the venire and avoid the public disclosure of intensely personal information
allows the juror to protect her privacy, avoids tainting other jurors on the same
venire, and better conforms to the historical protections afforded American
juries.229 It also reduces the risk that jurors will distort facts pertinent to their
biases. In other words, allowing a juror the right to exercise her own strike during
voir dire makes it increasingly likely that a criminal defendant’s guilt will be
judged by a fair-minded jury. After all, jurors with secrets in their past may be the
most biased and yet the least likely to talk honestly about their biases. If they do
reveal their embarrassing secrets, the litigants are very likely to rely on the
embarrassing information to strike the jurors from the venire.
Because a defendant has no right to a particular jury composition,230 there is
no constitutional or other legal prohibition against increasing jurors’ rights. The
prohibition rests in systematically excluding a protected class of persons from the
venire231 and from seating a partial juror.232 The juror strike proposed here
promotes both jury impartiality and juror privacy. A further benefit of the jury
strike is that it increases the incentives for the lawyers in the litigation to treat
jurors politely and with patience and dignity, understanding that if they push too
hard, jurors have recourse. As a result, lawyers will give more thought to what
questions they ask and how they word those questions. No longer will jurors be a
captive audience, powerless to extract themselves from an unduly aggressive voir
dire. At the same time, when a lawyer deems even a very probing question
important, she will know that by asking it, she is likely to find the answers to her
question, either inferred (from the juror exercising her personal juror strike) or
express by an oral or written response. In either event, the purposes underlying forcause and peremptory strikes are advanced. The juror strike thus reduces the
incentives for jurors to lie or withhold information out of embarrassment or
privacy concerns, and it gives litigants more space to probe deeply when
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they believe a juror may be withholding information in an effort to be seated
on the jury.
Also, the juror strike will encourage judges to protect jurors (so that they do
not perceive the need to exercise their personal strike) with more thoughtful rulings
on relevance during voir dire. Judges can protect both defendants’ rights and
jurors’ privacy interests by limiting the litigants to relevant questioning. In PressEnterprise, the Supreme Court expressly noted the importance of the trial judge in
ensuring a fair trial and protecting jurors from abusive voir dire:
To preserve fairness and at the same time protect legitimate privacy,
a trial judge must at all times maintain control of the process of jury
selection and should inform the array of prospective jurors, once the
general nature of sensitive questions is made known to them, that those
individuals believing public questioning will prove damaging because
of embarrassment, may properly request an opportunity to present
the problem to the judge in camera but with counsel present and
on the record.233
And the solution has few practical barriers. An individual judge may
implement the jury strike, or legislation or a local rule may effect the procedural
change. Furthermore, because each juror will be required to exercise her juror
strike in open court, this new procedure poses no threat to the media and public’s
rights to observe criminal trials.
B. The Mechanics of the Juror Strike
This final section explains how the juror strike might work in practice and
addresses a few of the potential arguments against such a change to the typical voir
dire procedure.
Under this proposal, when potential jurors are summonsed to a courtroom as
part of a jury venire, much of the usual process will remain the same. The judge
will read the indictment to the pool of potential jurors and explain in plain
language the issues in the case. For instance, in a bank robbery case, the judge will
read the formal indictment and tell the potential jurors that the case will require
them to decide whether the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
the named defendant robbed the specified bank. The judge will warn the jurors that
the lawyers (or the judge) will ask several questions of the jurors designed to make
sure that nothing in their experience and beliefs disqualifies them to sit on this
specific jury. The judge will also tell the pool of prospective jurors that if, for
reasons too personal to explain in public, they feel uncomfortable to decide the
accused’s guilt in this particular case, or to hear about criminal activity related to
these particular charges, (which might, for example, in a bank robbery case,
include allegations that weapons were fired or people were shot), then each juror
233
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holds the power to remove herself from this case and return to the jury pool to
serve as a potential juror in some other case. The judge would explain further that
each juror’s right to strike herself from the venire would continue throughout voir
dire until a jury is empanelled but caution that the right is restricted to reasonable,
not unlimited, use. The judge might also impress upon the jury the importance of
jury service and the expectation that each juror will exercise her voir dire strike
thoughtfully. The judge could then give an example of when the strike might be
appropriately exercised. For instance, the judge might explain:
Sometimes criminal cases touch on issues that are very personal and
sensitive. For some jurors this is not a problem. Others may find it
difficult to share information with the parties because of an experience
personal to them. This might happen, for instance, if one of you has been
the victim of a violent crime and find it painful to talk about the
experience. If you find yourself in this situation or one similar and you
find it painful to answer the litigant’s voir dire questions honestly and
fully, then you may exercise your right to exclude yourself from this pool
of jurors and return to the jury room for potential service on a different
case. You must, nevertheless, speak up and let us know that you are
exercising your strike.
Should a juror ask to exercise her strike, she would make the request publicly.
The judge would (also publicly) make a general inquiry to satisfy herself that the
juror was making reasonable use of the strike. This inquiry might proceed: “Juror
X, you say you wish to exercise your right to forgo service as a juror in this case
and return to the jury room for service on another panel. Can you, without giving
us specifics, explain why this case raises difficult or sensitive issues for you?”
Provided the juror offers a reasonable (albeit general) explanation, such as, “My
family has had to deal with some difficult issues in the last two years surrounding
allegations of criminal wrongdoing, and this case strikes too close to home for
me,” the judge would grant the juror’s request to return to the jury pool for
possible service in another matter. The juror would not be excused from jury duty
but would be included in another venire.234
The biggest objection to the juror strike is, perhaps, that it creates an incentive
for a juror to attempt to avoid duty altogether, traveling from courtroom to
courtroom exercising her personal strike. This concern is overblown. Jurors are
already familiar with the excuses for avoiding jury duty. Indeed, millions fail to
report for duty in the first place, even when summonsed.235 And this concern can
be lessened, in any event, provided the trial judge makes a limited inquiry into the
234
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reasonableness of each juror’s strike, and the jury clerk records each juror’s use of
her strikes, making a record of cases a juror has avoided. As outlined above, the
right to exercise a juror strike is not a pass out of jury service. Jurors exercising a
personal strike pretextually could be denied the right going forward, just as
litigants, even criminal defendants, are prevented from exercising peremptories
based on invalid grounds, such as race. Moreover, to the extent that providing
jurors some individual protections during service raises a risk that a small number
will abuse these rights does not outweigh the benefits of giving the protections.
The goal of any jury trial is to seat a qualified jury to impartially and fairly weigh
the evidence for and against guilt. Seating jurors who survive a sifting voir dire
and are willing to sit and hear the case better serves this goal than does seating
jurors who are hostile to service or who refuse to reveal information relevant to
bias during voir dire. And trial judges are already intimately familiar with deciding
between jurors’ excuses to avoid jury duty as well as between many other
competing arguments requiring the sound exercise of discretion and judgment.
Another argument against the juror strike might be that it does not eliminate
the incentives for a juror to lie in hopes of avoiding a for-cause or peremptory
strike, if her goal is to be seated to decide the case. If jurors are slanting their
answers in voir dire in hopes of reaching a jury, giving them the chance to remove
themselves from the venire will do little to lessen their deception. This
shortcoming should not defeat the proposal, nevertheless. The risk of jury
distortion exists with or without a juror strike because the strike is not designed to
prevent a juror’s intentional subversion of voir dire. Rather, the strike limits the
selection of jurors whose biases are concealed because of their discomfort about
probing questions. Although intentional juror deception remains a threat to an
impartial jury, it is precisely this type of bias that probing questions are designed to
uncover. And the proposal frees lawyers to probe for these biases more expressly.
Additionally, giving jurors some freedom to avoid such intensive probing reduces
the offensiveness of such probing questions.
CONCLUSION
Jurors are a crucial, indeed constitutional, component in our criminal justice
system. In modern times, despite their importance, jurors have been asked to reveal
intensely private information during voir dire. Litigants and trial judges have
allowed such probing questions under the guise of protecting the accused’s rights
to a fair and public trial and to an impartial jury. This Article has demonstrated that
giving prospective jurors greater privacy protection in the way of their own voir
dire challenge better serves the accused’s rights without jeopardizing the interests
of the media and public to observe these public proceedings. The added protection
for jurors also promotes faith and integrity in our criminal jury system, and it is
truer to the historic roots of voir dire.
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